{"title":"托管交互式应用程序的云提供商的个性化定价","authors":"Hossein Jahandideh,Julie Ward Drew,Filippo Balestrieri,Kevin McCardle","doi":"10.1287/serv.2020.0264","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider a cloud provider that hosts interactive applications, such as mobile apps and online games. Depending on the traffic of users for an application, the provider commits a subset of its resources (hardware capacity) to serve the application. The provider must choose a dynamic pricing mechanism to indirectly select the applications hosted and maximize revenue. We model the provider’s pricing problem as a large-scale stochastic dynamic program. To approach this problem, we propose a tractable approach to enable decomposing the multidimensional stochastic dynamic program into single-dimensional subproblems. We then extend the proposed framework to define an individualized dynamic pricing mechanism for the cloud provider. We present novel upper bounds on the optimal revenue to evaluate the performance of our pricing mechanism. The computational results show that a contract-based model of selling interactive cloud services achieves significantly greater revenue than the prevalent alternative and that our pricing scheme attains near-optimal revenue.","PeriodicalId":46249,"journal":{"name":"Service Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"130-147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Individualized Pricing for a Cloud Provider Hosting Interactive Applications\",\"authors\":\"Hossein Jahandideh,Julie Ward Drew,Filippo Balestrieri,Kevin McCardle\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/serv.2020.0264\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider a cloud provider that hosts interactive applications, such as mobile apps and online games. Depending on the traffic of users for an application, the provider commits a subset of its resources (hardware capacity) to serve the application. The provider must choose a dynamic pricing mechanism to indirectly select the applications hosted and maximize revenue. We model the provider’s pricing problem as a large-scale stochastic dynamic program. To approach this problem, we propose a tractable approach to enable decomposing the multidimensional stochastic dynamic program into single-dimensional subproblems. We then extend the proposed framework to define an individualized dynamic pricing mechanism for the cloud provider. We present novel upper bounds on the optimal revenue to evaluate the performance of our pricing mechanism. The computational results show that a contract-based model of selling interactive cloud services achieves significantly greater revenue than the prevalent alternative and that our pricing scheme attains near-optimal revenue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46249,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Service Science\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"130-147\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Service Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2020.0264\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Service Science","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2020.0264","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Individualized Pricing for a Cloud Provider Hosting Interactive Applications
We consider a cloud provider that hosts interactive applications, such as mobile apps and online games. Depending on the traffic of users for an application, the provider commits a subset of its resources (hardware capacity) to serve the application. The provider must choose a dynamic pricing mechanism to indirectly select the applications hosted and maximize revenue. We model the provider’s pricing problem as a large-scale stochastic dynamic program. To approach this problem, we propose a tractable approach to enable decomposing the multidimensional stochastic dynamic program into single-dimensional subproblems. We then extend the proposed framework to define an individualized dynamic pricing mechanism for the cloud provider. We present novel upper bounds on the optimal revenue to evaluate the performance of our pricing mechanism. The computational results show that a contract-based model of selling interactive cloud services achieves significantly greater revenue than the prevalent alternative and that our pricing scheme attains near-optimal revenue.
期刊介绍:
Service Science publishes innovative and original papers on all topics related to service, including work that crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries. It is the primary forum for presenting new theories and new empirical results in the emerging, interdisciplinary science of service, incorporating research, education, and practice, documenting empirical, modeling, and theoretical studies of service and service systems. Topics covered include but are not limited to the following: Service Management, Operations, Engineering, Economics, Design, and Marketing Service System Analysis and Computational Simulation Service Theories and Research Methods Case Studies and Application Areas, such as healthcare, energy, finance, information technology, logistics, and public services.