税收和投票率:当决定性的选民呆在家里

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-01-28 DOI:10.1257/aer.20171927

Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin

{"title":"税收和投票率:当决定性的选民呆在家里","authors":"Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20171927","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"513 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home\",\"authors\":\"Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aer.20171927\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)\",\"PeriodicalId\":48472,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"513 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":10.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171927\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171927","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们建立了一个具有内生投票率和内生平台的政治竞争模型。政党在激励自己的支持者投票和阻止竞争政党的支持者投票之间进行权衡。我们表明，后一个目标对于一个在政治竞赛中具有优势的政党来说尤其明显。因此，对一个政党的政治支持的增加可能导致采取有利于其对手的政策，从而不对称地使其复员。我们研究了再分配税收对政治经济学的影响。均衡税收政策通常与退役选民的利益相一致。(凝胶d63, d72, h23, h24)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.