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引用次数: 1
摘要
本文研究了具有任意数量(奇数或偶数)对战的团队竞赛的努力最大化设计。在选手和对战完全异质的情况下,组织者根据对战结果决定奖金分配规则(或不可分割奖金的获胜规则)。我们提出了一种衡量团队实力的方法,它在奖品设计中起着至关重要的作用。最佳设计是多数得分规则,弱队获得领先得分:所有战斗的得分都与团队无关,较弱的团队会获得一个初始领先分数,这个分数就是团队之间的实力差距,在获胜的战斗中获得较高总分的团队将赢得全部奖金。最佳规则类似于广泛采用的 Elo 评分系统。
Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a team contest with an arbitrary number (odd or even) of pairwise battles. In a setting with full heterogeneity across players and battles, the organizer determines the prize allocation rule (or the winning rule of an indivisible prize) contingent on battle outcomes. We propose a measure of team's strength, which plays a crucial role in prize design. The optimal design is a majority-score rule with a headstart score granted to the weaker team: All battles are assigned team-invariant scores, the weaker team is given an initial headstart score which is the difference in strengths between teams, and the team collecting higher total scores from its winning battles wins the entire prize. The optimal rule resembles the widely-adopted Elo rating system.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.