{"title":"基于考试的问责制和教育公平:突破地方地区政治?","authors":"John J. Gregg, Stéphane Lavertu","doi":"10.1016/j.econedurev.2023.102485","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A central premise of the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was that test-based accountability systems would break through local politics and lead districts to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged students. Yet, no research examines the equity-related effects of NCLB’s district accountability system. Focusing on a state with rich data, we find that negative ratings (which put districts at higher risk of state intervention) led to the disenrollment of economically disadvantaged students (ostensibly leading to a decline in income-based school segregation) and a corresponding (suspicious) jump in test scores. Negative ratings also led to changes in collectively bargained personnel policies and the replacement of teachers in disadvantaged students’ schools. There was no redistribution of funds toward disadvantaged students’ schools, however, and likely minimal impact on district elections. The results put into question whether a shift in district governance helps explain NCLB’s well-documented positive impacts on low-income students’ academic outcomes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48261,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Education Review","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 102485"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Test-based accountability and educational equity: Breaking through local district politics?\",\"authors\":\"John J. Gregg, Stéphane Lavertu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econedurev.2023.102485\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>A central premise of the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was that test-based accountability systems would break through local politics and lead districts to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged students. Yet, no research examines the equity-related effects of NCLB’s district accountability system. Focusing on a state with rich data, we find that negative ratings (which put districts at higher risk of state intervention) led to the disenrollment of economically disadvantaged students (ostensibly leading to a decline in income-based school segregation) and a corresponding (suspicious) jump in test scores. Negative ratings also led to changes in collectively bargained personnel policies and the replacement of teachers in disadvantaged students’ schools. There was no redistribution of funds toward disadvantaged students’ schools, however, and likely minimal impact on district elections. The results put into question whether a shift in district governance helps explain NCLB’s well-documented positive impacts on low-income students’ academic outcomes.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48261,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics of Education Review\",\"volume\":\"97 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102485\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics of Education Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723001322\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Education Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723001322","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Test-based accountability and educational equity: Breaking through local district politics?
A central premise of the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was that test-based accountability systems would break through local politics and lead districts to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged students. Yet, no research examines the equity-related effects of NCLB’s district accountability system. Focusing on a state with rich data, we find that negative ratings (which put districts at higher risk of state intervention) led to the disenrollment of economically disadvantaged students (ostensibly leading to a decline in income-based school segregation) and a corresponding (suspicious) jump in test scores. Negative ratings also led to changes in collectively bargained personnel policies and the replacement of teachers in disadvantaged students’ schools. There was no redistribution of funds toward disadvantaged students’ schools, however, and likely minimal impact on district elections. The results put into question whether a shift in district governance helps explain NCLB’s well-documented positive impacts on low-income students’ academic outcomes.
期刊介绍:
Economics of Education Review publishes research on education policy and finance, human capital production and acquisition, and the returns to human capital. We accept empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions, but the main focus of Economics of Education Review is on applied studies that employ micro data and clear identification strategies. Our goal is to publish innovative, cutting-edge research on the economics of education that is of interest to academics, policymakers and the public. Starting with papers submitted March 1, 2014, the review process for articles submitted to the Economics of Education Review will no longer be double blind. Authors are requested to include a title page with authors'' names and affiliation. Reviewers will continue to be anonymous.