重新谈判公私伙伴关系

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Joaquim Miranda Sarmento , Luc Renneboog
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引用次数: 0

摘要

公私伙伴关系(ppp)往往需要重新谈判,因为它们的合同是长期的,通常超过30年,涉及重大投资,并且必要时不完整。然而,尽管合同不完整难以避免,但尽管有几十年的经验,重新谈判的频率并没有下降。选举周期和政治关系导致公共部门和私人实体的战略行为,旨在取悦选民,通常利用政府无法承受选举前公共服务中断的事实。议价能力主要掌握在私人公司/企业财团手中,他们收取额外租金,以弥补最初几轮投标时的低出价。当一个财团由外国公司主导时,谈判的频率较高,但从重新谈判中提取的租金较低,反映了较低程度的政治联系。PPP项目的经验并不会降低后续重新谈判的可能性。尽管PPP监管机构(审计法院)提出了建议,但公共部门并没有对PPP合同的设计和重新谈判条款进行改进。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Renegotiating public-private partnerships

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are frequently renegotiated as their contracts are long-term, often with a duration exceeding 30 years, involve major investments, and are necessary incomplete. Still, while contract incompleteness is difficult to prevent, renegotiation frequency does not decline in spite of decades of experience. Electoral cycles and political connections lead to strategic behaviour by both the public sector, intending to please the electorate, and the private entity, often taking advantage of the fact that the government cannot afford disruption in public services prior to elections. The bargaining power is held mainly by private firms/corporate consortiums who extract additional rents to compensate for underbidding at the initial bidding rounds. When a consortium dominated by a foreign firm, the frequency of negotiations is higher but the extraction of rents from renegotiations is lower, reflecting a lower degree of political connectedness. Experience with PPP projects does not reduce the likelihood of subsequent renegotiations. In spite of the recommendations of the PPP supervisor (the Court of Audit), the public sector has not implemented improvements in contract design and renegotiations clauses of PPP contracts.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
4.80%
发文量
25
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.
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