Elham Amini, Tuba Kiyan, Lars Renkes, Thilo Krachenfels, Christian Boit, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Jörg Jatzkowski, Frank Altmann, Sebastian Brand, Shahin Tajik
{"title":"电子与光子:电子束和光学探测攻击的电路活动性要求评估","authors":"Elham Amini, Tuba Kiyan, Lars Renkes, Thilo Krachenfels, Christian Boit, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Jörg Jatzkowski, Frank Altmann, Sebastian Brand, Shahin Tajik","doi":"10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2023p0339","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contactless probing methods through the chip backside have been demonstrated to be powerful attack techniques in the field of electronic security. However, these attacks typically require the adversary to run the circuit under specific conditions, such as enforcing the switching of gates or registers with certain frequencies or repeating measurements over multiple executions to achieve an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Fulfilling such requirements may not always be feasible due to challenges such as low-frequency switching or inaccessibility of the control signals. In this work, we assess these requirements for contactless electron- and photon-based probing attacks by performing extensive experiments. Our findings demonstrate that E-beam probing, in particular, has the potential to outperform optical methods in scenarios involving static or low-frequency circuit activities.","PeriodicalId":20443,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Electrons Vs. Photons: Assessment of Circuit’s Activity Requirements for E-Beam and Optical Probing Attacks\",\"authors\":\"Elham Amini, Tuba Kiyan, Lars Renkes, Thilo Krachenfels, Christian Boit, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Jörg Jatzkowski, Frank Altmann, Sebastian Brand, Shahin Tajik\",\"doi\":\"10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2023p0339\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Contactless probing methods through the chip backside have been demonstrated to be powerful attack techniques in the field of electronic security. However, these attacks typically require the adversary to run the circuit under specific conditions, such as enforcing the switching of gates or registers with certain frequencies or repeating measurements over multiple executions to achieve an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Fulfilling such requirements may not always be feasible due to challenges such as low-frequency switching or inaccessibility of the control signals. In this work, we assess these requirements for contactless electron- and photon-based probing attacks by performing extensive experiments. Our findings demonstrate that E-beam probing, in particular, has the potential to outperform optical methods in scenarios involving static or low-frequency circuit activities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":20443,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2023p0339\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2023p0339","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Electrons Vs. Photons: Assessment of Circuit’s Activity Requirements for E-Beam and Optical Probing Attacks
Abstract Contactless probing methods through the chip backside have been demonstrated to be powerful attack techniques in the field of electronic security. However, these attacks typically require the adversary to run the circuit under specific conditions, such as enforcing the switching of gates or registers with certain frequencies or repeating measurements over multiple executions to achieve an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Fulfilling such requirements may not always be feasible due to challenges such as low-frequency switching or inaccessibility of the control signals. In this work, we assess these requirements for contactless electron- and photon-based probing attacks by performing extensive experiments. Our findings demonstrate that E-beam probing, in particular, has the potential to outperform optical methods in scenarios involving static or low-frequency circuit activities.