Alliance and sectarian attitudes in the MENA: the case of Arab opinion towards Iran

ABSTRACTDespite a growing body of analyses on sectarian tensions in the MENA, few have examined the impact of sectarian attitudes on public opinion towards the regional powers. Drawing from a statistical analysis of public opinion polls and the case study of Egypt and Sudan, the paper examines determinants of public attitudes towards Iran in the post-Arab spring era. The analysis indicates that public attitudes towards the regional player, i.e. Iran influenced by the alliance in the MENA. Although the Arab spring fuelled the negative sentiments towards Iran in the allies of Saudi Arabia, strong ties between Iran and the Islamist rule shaped positive attitudes towards Iran in Sudan. The analysis further reveals the impact of Salafi’s anti-Iran campaigns in Egypt. This campaign utilizes negative symbolism and ethnoreligious myths to depict Shias as an enemy and construct an existential threat from Iran. In this environment, the symbolic politics and emotionally laden hatred in the Arab countries explain the sectarian attitudes towards Shias and Iran. AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Nukhet Sandal, and Aisha Ahmad for their cogent comments on the earlier draft of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2251120.Notes1 This growing body of analysis led some scholar to argue that term of sectarianism has lost its analytic effectiveness. As a result, sectarianism needs more specific adjectives such as doctrinal, subnational, national, transnational Haddad, F. (2020). Understanding ‘Sectarianism’: Sunni-Shi’a Relations in the Modern Arab World, Oxford University Press, U.S.A.2 This meta-study of new studies of sectarianism in the MENA develops a typology of three groups of studies. 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The political economy of sectarianism in the Gulf, JSTOR24 In some countries such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the sectarian identity entrepreneurs portrayed the Shia opposition as the fifth column and agent of foreign powers i.e. Iran, to justify the suppression..25 In addition to these strategies, hostile rumors against Iran was prevalent after the Arab spring. For instance, a rumor spread that Iran exported poisonous watermelons to Arab countries to massacre Arab citizens. ‘The chief deputy of Dubai police tweeted: “after Iranian poisoned watermelons, all Iranian fruits are dangerous”. Rumors of Arabs about Iranian watermelon’, ISNA News Agency, 5/3/2015, https://www.isna.ir/news/9402130734326 Edelman, Politics as symbolic action, P54.27 Abou-El-Fadl, R. (2015). Between Cairo and Washington: Sectarianism and counter-revolution in post-Mubarak Egypt. Revolutionary Egypt, Routledge: 227–253.Hassan, A. F. (2015). 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Survival 56(1): 79–100.49 Kristen McTighe, ‘The Salafi Nour Party in Egypt’, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 3/26/2014, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/03/20143261283362726.htmlAlso (Zalat and Hamama 2015) and (Hassan 2015, 256)50 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech’, 06/27/2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/27/egypt-lynching-shia-follows-months-hate-speech51 Ibrahim Al Masry, ‘Al-Nour and FJP clash over Iranian tourism’ Daily News Egypt, 5/13/2013 https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/13/al-nour-and-fjp-clash-over-iranian-tourism/52 As a Salafi leader argues: “It is more likely for an Egyptian to convert to Shi‘ism than to Judaism or Christianity … there is a secret plan behind Iranian tourism, and that is spreading Shi’ism in Egypt”. (Saleh and Kraetzschmar, 2015).53 Free Europe Radio, ‘Egyptian Artists Denounce Ban on Projection of the Movie “A Separation” in Cairo University’ in Farsi 2/24/2012, https://www.radiofarda.com/a/24515862.html54 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech’, 06/27/2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/27/egypt-lynching-shia-follows-months-hate-speech55 Sherene Seikaly and Adel Iskandar, “Between Inaction and Complicity the Shi‘a and the Brotherhood”, 6/29/2013, Jadaliyya, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28874/Between-Inaction-and-Complicity-The-Shi%E2%80%98a-and-the-Brotherhood56 Some reports indicates that Saudi clerics travelled to Egypt before the event and incited sectarian rhetoric. (Mohsen, 2013)57 Ikhwan online, ‘There is no place for Shi’ism in Egypt’ in Arabic, 4/8/2013, https://ikhwanonline.com/article/14515258 Al-Arabiya, ‘Mahmoud Shaaban, warned that Shi’ism had started to spread in Egypt’, 5/16/2013, https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/egypt/2013/05/16/%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-59 Brooke, S. (2017). ‘Sectarianism and social conformity: Evidence from Egypt’. Political Research Quarterly 70(4): 848–860.60 Brooke’s list experiment study indicates that because of prevalent anti Shia rhetoric, a portion of Egyptians inflate their self-reported attitudes. 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January 2019: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Methods_Report-1.pdf76 To prevent the spread of Shia Islam, the Sudan government closed all Iranian cultural centres, and Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and significantly limited ties with Iran after the execution of Shia cleric Al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia.77 Jamal Al Sharif, ‘Salafis in Sudan: Non-Interference or Confrontation’, Aljazeera Center for Studies, 07/03/2012, https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/126078 According to this survey, 9% of the respondent say they belong to Sufi order in Egypt. 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