轻罪起诉

IF 11.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Amanda Agan, Jennifer L Doleac, Anna Harvey
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引用次数: 3

摘要

美国各地的社区都在重新考虑起诉非暴力轻罪对公共安全的好处,但在这一领域,几乎没有经验证据可以为政策提供信息。我们报告了对轻罪起诉对被告随后的刑事司法参与的因果影响的第一次估计。我们将非暴力轻罪案件随机分配给助理地区检察官(ADAs),由他们决定是否在马萨诸塞州萨福克县地区检察官办公室起诉一个案件。这些助理检察官的起诉决定的平均宽大程度各不相同。我们发现,对于边缘被告,非暴力轻罪的不起诉导致在接下来的两年里,新的刑事诉讼的可能性降低了53%新的刑事诉讼的数量减少了60%。对于没有犯罪记录的被告,这些当地平均治疗效果最大,这表明避免获取犯罪记录是推动我们研究结果的重要机制。我们还提供证据表明,萨福克县最近的一项政策变化,对非暴力轻罪推定不起诉,具有类似的有益效果,降低了随后刑事司法介入的可能性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Misdemeanor Prosecution
Abstract Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses, yet there is little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. We report the first estimates of the causal effects of misdemeanor prosecution on defendants’ subsequent criminal justice involvement. We leverage the as-if random assignment of nonviolent misdemeanor cases to assistant district attorneys (ADAs) who decide whether a case should be prosecuted in the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts. These ADAs vary in the average leniency of their prosecution decisions. We find that for the marginal defendant, nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to a 53% reduction in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint and a 60% reduction in the number of new criminal complaints over the next two years. These local average treatment effects are largest for defendants without prior criminal records, suggesting that averting criminal record acquisition is an important mechanism driving our findings. We also present evidence that a recent policy change in Suffolk County imposing a presumption of nonprosecution for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses had similar beneficial effects, decreasing the likelihood of subsequent criminal justice involvement.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
24.20
自引率
2.20%
发文量
42
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Economics stands as the oldest professional journal of economics in the English language. Published under the editorial guidance of Harvard University's Department of Economics, it comprehensively covers all aspects of the field. Esteemed by professional and academic economists as well as students worldwide, QJE holds unparalleled value in the economic discourse.
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