社会保障申请行为的核算

IF 1.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2023-07-27 DOI:10.1111/iere.12658

Svetlana Pashchenko, Ponpoje Porapakkarm

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了社会保障福利金申领集中在 62 岁和完全退休年龄这两个年龄段的原因，并提供了三个主要发现。首先，我们表明，完全理性的代理人的生命周期模型可以很好地解释申领行为。两个关键机制是：（i）持有年金的强烈意愿和（ii）收入测试的影响。其次，我们表明现行规则扭曲了申领和劳动力供给决策，而消除这些扭曲会带来巨大的福利收益。最后，我们表明，可以利用申领决策来加强对重要偏好参数的识别。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMING BEHAVIOR

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ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMING BEHAVIOR

We study why Social Security benefit claiming is concentrated at two ages, 62 and the full retirement age, and provide three main findings. First, we show that claiming behavior can be well explained by a parsimonious life-cycle model with fully rational agents. The two key mechanisms are (i) the strong unwillingness to hold annuities and (ii) the effects of the earnings test. Second, we show that current rules distort claiming and labor supply decisions, and eliminating these distortions results in large welfare gains. Finally, we show that claiming decisions can be used to sharpen the identification of important preference parameters.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.