配偶效应与首席执行官的冒险行为

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Qianqian Du, Valerie Li, Lin Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了首席执行官的家庭生活如何影响其公司决策。具体而言,我们研究了首席执行官配偶的职业身份是否会影响首席执行官的风险承担行为。通过对 2010 年至 2012 年期间 S&P 500 强企业的抽样调查,我们发现有证据表明,首席执行官的配偶是专业人士,即工作配偶、拥有研究生学位的配偶或毕业于常春藤盟校的配偶,他们倾向于采取风险更高的公司政策。我们的证据表明,配偶为专业人士的首席执行官所领导的公司表现出更高的会计收益波动性,做出更激进的财务报告决策,并更多地投资于风险资产。我们没有发现职业配偶与公司的市场回报波动性之间有明显的关联。我们的结果与间接渠道理论相一致,该理论认为,拥有职业配偶的首席执行官可能倾向于承担更高的风险,这可能源于家庭与工作之间的冲突加剧,或其配偶的职业地位提高了财富的多样化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The spouse effect and CEO risk-taking

We examine how a CEO's family life affects their corporate decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether a CEO's spouse's professional status affects the CEO's risk-taking behavior. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from the 2010 to 2012 period, we find evidence that CEOs with spouses who are professionals, defined as working spouses, spouses holding graduate degrees, or spouses graduated from Ivy League schools, tend to adopt riskier corporate policies. Our evidence suggests that firms led by CEOs with professional spouses exhibit higher accounting return volatility, make more aggressive financial reporting decisions, and invest more in risky assets. We do not find a significant association between professional spouses and firms’ market return volatility. Our results are consistent with the indirect channel theory, which suggests that CEOs with professional spouses might be inclined to undertake higher risks, potentially stemming from heightened conflicts between family and work commitments or improved wealth diversification attributed to their spouses' professional standing.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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