跟着政客走

IF 5.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yongwei Nian, Chunyang Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

中国的地方领导人经常在县之间调动。通过结合2006年至2016年各地县的地方领导人轮换数据和综合企业土地购买数据,本文研究了企业-政治家关系如何影响资源配置,并发现总部位于领导人前任工作州的企业在该领导人新执政州购买的土地数量是州年平均值的三倍,而单价是州年平均值的一半。通过外生政治家轮换,从各县的公司年内变化进行识别。这些跟随企业的地块土地利用效率较低。土地分配扭曲在经济上也是相当大的。(jel d22, d72, o17, o18, p25, p26)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Go with the Politician
Chinese local leaders are frequently moved across prefectures. By combining local leader rotation data and comprehensive firm land parcel purchase data across prefectures from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines how firm–politician connections affect resource allocation and finds that a firm headquartered in a leader’s previous work prefecture purchases three times more land parcels in that leader’s new governing prefecture than the prefecture-year mean, at half the unit prices. Identification is from within-firm-year variation in various prefectures through exogenous politician rotation. Land usage efficiency is lower for these follower firms’ land parcels. Land allocation distortion is also economically sizable. (JEL D22, D72, O17, O18, P25, P26)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.20
自引率
1.90%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) is a general-interest economics journal. The journal publishes 12 issues containing articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in economics. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy publishes papers covering a range of topics, the common theme being the role of economic policy in economic outcomes. Subject areas include public economics; urban and regional economics; public policy aspects of health, education, welfare and political institutions; law and economics; economic regulation; and environmental and natural resource economics.
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