综合数据隐私风险量化的统一框架

Matteo Giomi, Franziska Boenisch, Christoph Wehmeyer, Borbála Tasnádi
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引用次数: 2

摘要

合成数据通常是一种以保护隐私的方式共享敏感信息的方法,通过再现原始数据的全局统计属性而不泄露任何个人的敏感信息。在实践中,与其他匿名化方法一样,合成数据不能完全消除隐私风险。这些残留的隐私风险需要事后发现和评估。然而,考虑到数据隐私的众多方面,量化任何合成数据集的实际隐私风险是一项艰巨的任务。我们提出了一个统计框架,用于联合量化合成表格数据集中不同类型的隐私风险。我们为该框架配备了基于攻击的评估,用于挑选,链接和推断风险,这是根据数据保护法规(如欧洲通用数据保护条例(GDPR))的事实匿名化的三个关键指标。据我们所知,我们是第一个对合成数据的这三种隐私风险进行连贯和法律一致评估的公司,并设计了直接模拟挑出和链接风险的隐私攻击。我们通过进行一组广泛的实验来证明我们方法的有效性,这些实验测量了故意插入隐私泄漏的数据的隐私风险,以及有和没有差异隐私生成的合成数据的隐私风险。我们的研究结果表明,我们的框架报告的三种隐私风险与数据中隐私泄漏的数量呈线性关系。此外,我们观察到合成数据对链接性的脆弱性最低,这表明真实数据和合成数据记录之间没有保持一对一的关系。最后,通过定量比较,我们证明Anonymeter在检测隐私泄露和计算速度方面优于现有的综合数据隐私评估框架。为了对合成数据的隐私使用做出贡献,我们将Anonymeter作为开源库发布(https://github.com/statice/anonymeter)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Unified Framework for Quantifying Privacy Risk in Synthetic Data
Synthetic data is often presented as a method for sharing sensitive information in a privacy-preserving manner by reproducing the global statistical properties of the original data without dis closing sensitive information about any individual. In practice, as with other anonymization methods, synthetic data cannot entirely eliminate privacy risks. These residual privacy risks need instead to be ex-post uncovered and assessed. However, quantifying the actual privacy risks of any synthetic dataset is a hard task, given the multitude of facets of data privacy. We present Anonymeter, a statistical framework to jointly quantify different types of privacy risks in synthetic tabular datasets. We equip this framework with attack-based evaluations for the singling out, linkability, and inference risks, which are the three key indicators of factual anonymization according to data protection regulations, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce a coherent and legally aligned evaluation of these three privacy risks for synthetic data, as well as to design privacy attacks which model directly the singling out and linkability risks. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods by conducting an extensive set of experiments that measure the privacy risks of data with deliberately inserted privacy leakages, and of synthetic data generated with and without differential privacy. Our results highlight that the three privacy risks reported by our framework scale linearly with the amount of privacy leakage in the data. Furthermore, we observe that synthetic data exhibits the lowest vulnerability against linkability, indicating one-to-one relationships between real and synthetic data records are not preserved. Finally, with a quantitative comparison we demonstrate that Anonymeter outperforms existing synthetic data privacy evaluation frameworks both in terms of detecting privacy leaks, as well as computation speed. To contribute to a privacy-conscious usage of synthetic data, we publish Anonymeter as an open-source library (https://github.com/statice/anonymeter).
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