The Strategic Gambit: How U.S. Allies’ Rapprochement with Adversaries Influences American Support

This paper aims to test whether U.S. allies can bolster deterrence of U.S. alliances by bringing about rapprochement with their rivalries. The argument presented here entails that defender’s military support to its protégé depends on whether the protégé mobilizes the strategic option to retaliate against the defender if it is abandoned by the defender. Direct evidence to support the argument is revealed in the results of analyses over the entire period 1816-2014. Particularly during the Cold War, the U.S. allies are much more likely to bolster the deterrence of U.S. alliances by building up rapprochement with challengers. Yet, during the period 2001-2014, there is little evidence that U.S. bilateral allies could induce the U.S. support. Rather, U.S. bilateral allies having close trade ties with challengers are far more likely to be targets of dispute initiation. These findings have significant practical implications for Korea. First, in a strategic move to protect its interests, S. Korea should pursue comprehensive ties with its northern counterpart, as a hedge against the potentially unreliable relationship with the U.S. Second, as S. Korea persistently relies on the security assurances of the U.S. and the rearmed Japan, it unknowingly exposes itself to a treacherous game in which the great powers readily sacrifice its interests, people, and territories, all in the name of preserving a delicate balance in the region. Finally, the realization of a fully armed and reunited Korea stands as the essential factor in neutralizing the shared common interests of the great powers on the divided Korean Peninsula, strategically countering their hegemonic ambitions.