走钢索:在研究-实践伙伴关系中导航委托-代理困境

IF 2.4 1区 教育学 Q1 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Megan Duff, Joshua L. Glazer, Matthew Shirrell, Dryw Freed
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引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管研究联盟(RAs)长期以来一直被视为互惠互利的,但在利益相关者不同的目标、激励和信息中,RAs面临着许多障碍。这个纵向的比较案例研究使用委托代理理论来分析这些相互依赖的挑战以及它们与RA策略和设计的关系。研究结果表明,虽然一些RA可以更好地设计来平衡不同利益相关者的竞争利益,但这些利益相关者对RA有效性的定义越来越有争议,这混淆了RA的身份。因此,RA研究人员现在经常被要求满足他们的组织最初设计时无法满足的期望。我们认为,这对如何资助、设计和最终评估RAs有影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Walking a Tightrope: Navigating Principal-Agent Dilemmas in Research-Practice Partnerships
Although research alliances (RAs) have long been seen as mutualistic and reciprocal, RAs face numerous obstacles navigating stakeholders’ differing goals, incentives, and information. This longitudinal, comparative case study of two RAs uses principal-agent theory to analyze these interdependent challenges and their relationship to RA strategy and design. Findings suggest that while some RAs may be better designed to balance the competing interests of various stakeholders, increasingly contested definitions of RA effectiveness among those stakeholders have muddled RA identities. As a result, RA researchers are now often held to expectations that their organizations were not originally designed to meet. We argue that this has implications for how RAs are funded, designed, and, ultimately, evaluated.
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来源期刊
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
5.90%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis (EEPA) publishes manuscripts of theoretical or practical interest to those engaged in educational evaluation or policy analysis, including economic, demographic, financial, and political analyses of education policies, and significant meta-analyses or syntheses that address issues of current concern. The journal seeks high-quality research on how reforms and interventions affect educational outcomes; research on how multiple educational policy and reform initiatives support or conflict with each other; and research that informs pending changes in educational policy at the federal, state, and local levels, demonstrating an effect on early childhood through early adulthood.
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