{"title":"作为修订报告错报:对管理人员使用重大裁量权的评价","authors":"Rachel A. Thompson","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12877","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In recent years, firms reporting revisions of prior financial statements outnumber those reporting restatements. Misstatements that are material to prior periods are required to be reported as restatements, whereas immaterial errors can be reported as revisions. Based on SEC guidance and widely used materiality benchmarks, I find a significant percentage (29%) of revisions are suspect in that they meet at least one materiality criterion. These suspect revisions are 15% to 29% more likely to be reported when managers have a strong incentive to avoid restatements—when they face the threat of a compensation clawback for reporting a restatement. This result is especially salient when the clawback policy does not require misconduct for recoupment and when the error correction significantly reduces prior period net income. Overall, this evidence suggests that some managers use materiality discretion opportunistically to report misstatements as revisions instead of restatements.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Reporting misstatements as revisions: An evaluation of managers' use of materiality discretion\",\"authors\":\"Rachel A. Thompson\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1911-3846.12877\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In recent years, firms reporting revisions of prior financial statements outnumber those reporting restatements. Misstatements that are material to prior periods are required to be reported as restatements, whereas immaterial errors can be reported as revisions. Based on SEC guidance and widely used materiality benchmarks, I find a significant percentage (29%) of revisions are suspect in that they meet at least one materiality criterion. These suspect revisions are 15% to 29% more likely to be reported when managers have a strong incentive to avoid restatements—when they face the threat of a compensation clawback for reporting a restatement. This result is especially salient when the clawback policy does not require misconduct for recoupment and when the error correction significantly reduces prior period net income. Overall, this evidence suggests that some managers use materiality discretion opportunistically to report misstatements as revisions instead of restatements.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":10595,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Contemporary Accounting Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Contemporary Accounting Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3846.12877\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Contemporary Accounting Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3846.12877","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Reporting misstatements as revisions: An evaluation of managers' use of materiality discretion
In recent years, firms reporting revisions of prior financial statements outnumber those reporting restatements. Misstatements that are material to prior periods are required to be reported as restatements, whereas immaterial errors can be reported as revisions. Based on SEC guidance and widely used materiality benchmarks, I find a significant percentage (29%) of revisions are suspect in that they meet at least one materiality criterion. These suspect revisions are 15% to 29% more likely to be reported when managers have a strong incentive to avoid restatements—when they face the threat of a compensation clawback for reporting a restatement. This result is especially salient when the clawback policy does not require misconduct for recoupment and when the error correction significantly reduces prior period net income. Overall, this evidence suggests that some managers use materiality discretion opportunistically to report misstatements as revisions instead of restatements.
期刊介绍:
Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.