{"title":"委托承担风险、问责制和结果偏差","authors":"Robert M. Gillenkirch, Louis Velthuis","doi":"10.1007/s11166-023-09414-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a sequence of experiments, this study investigates how people evaluate others who make risky decisions on their behalf, and how such evaluations affect delegated risk-taking. A decision maker acts on behalf of a client who holds the decision maker accountable by way of a subjective evaluation after observing a risky decision’s outcome. If evaluation is biased towards the outcome, it may have dysfunctional effects with respect to delegated risk-taking in that decision makers’ risk choices are increasingly misaligned with their clients’ risk preferences. We find evidence giving support to this conjecture. Across and within three experiments, we test for the effects of different types and degrees of accountability in that we manipulate the information available to clients as well as the consequences which evaluations have for decision makers. Evaluations are biased towards outcomes in all experiments. When evaluations affect decision maker’s compensations, a stronger outcome bias in evaluations translates into risk-taking decisions being less frequently aligned with clients’ risk preferences. In the same situation, giving clients the opportunity to make peer comparisons increases outcome bias. We further find that clients do not hold decision makers accountable for their risk choices when they cannot observe the risk-taking decision, but have to infer it from observing the outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.","PeriodicalId":48066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Uncertainty","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Delegated risk-taking, accountability, and outcome bias\",\"authors\":\"Robert M. Gillenkirch, Louis Velthuis\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11166-023-09414-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract In a sequence of experiments, this study investigates how people evaluate others who make risky decisions on their behalf, and how such evaluations affect delegated risk-taking. A decision maker acts on behalf of a client who holds the decision maker accountable by way of a subjective evaluation after observing a risky decision’s outcome. If evaluation is biased towards the outcome, it may have dysfunctional effects with respect to delegated risk-taking in that decision makers’ risk choices are increasingly misaligned with their clients’ risk preferences. We find evidence giving support to this conjecture. Across and within three experiments, we test for the effects of different types and degrees of accountability in that we manipulate the information available to clients as well as the consequences which evaluations have for decision makers. Evaluations are biased towards outcomes in all experiments. When evaluations affect decision maker’s compensations, a stronger outcome bias in evaluations translates into risk-taking decisions being less frequently aligned with clients’ risk preferences. In the same situation, giving clients the opportunity to make peer comparisons increases outcome bias. We further find that clients do not hold decision makers accountable for their risk choices when they cannot observe the risk-taking decision, but have to infer it from observing the outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48066,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Risk and Uncertainty\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Risk and Uncertainty\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-023-09414-2\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Risk and Uncertainty","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-023-09414-2","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Delegated risk-taking, accountability, and outcome bias
Abstract In a sequence of experiments, this study investigates how people evaluate others who make risky decisions on their behalf, and how such evaluations affect delegated risk-taking. A decision maker acts on behalf of a client who holds the decision maker accountable by way of a subjective evaluation after observing a risky decision’s outcome. If evaluation is biased towards the outcome, it may have dysfunctional effects with respect to delegated risk-taking in that decision makers’ risk choices are increasingly misaligned with their clients’ risk preferences. We find evidence giving support to this conjecture. Across and within three experiments, we test for the effects of different types and degrees of accountability in that we manipulate the information available to clients as well as the consequences which evaluations have for decision makers. Evaluations are biased towards outcomes in all experiments. When evaluations affect decision maker’s compensations, a stronger outcome bias in evaluations translates into risk-taking decisions being less frequently aligned with clients’ risk preferences. In the same situation, giving clients the opportunity to make peer comparisons increases outcome bias. We further find that clients do not hold decision makers accountable for their risk choices when they cannot observe the risk-taking decision, but have to infer it from observing the outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (JRU) welcomes original empirical, experimental, and theoretical manuscripts dealing with the analysis of risk-bearing behavior and decision making under uncertainty. The topics covered in the journal include, but are not limited to, decision theory and the economics of uncertainty, experimental investigations of behavior under uncertainty, empirical studies of real world risk-taking behavior, behavioral models of choice under uncertainty, and risk and public policy. Review papers are welcome.
The JRU does not publish finance or behavioral finance research, game theory, note length work, or papers that treat Likert-type scales as having cardinal significance.
An important aim of the JRU is to encourage interdisciplinary communication and interaction between researchers in the area of risk and uncertainty. Authors are expected to provide introductory discussions which set forth the nature of their research and the interpretation and implications of their findings in a manner accessible to knowledgeable researchers in other disciplines.
Officially cited as: J Risk Uncertain