围绕反向拆股的盈利管理

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shrikant P. Jategaonkar, Yuan Shi, Xiaoxiao Song
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用 1988 年至 2019 年期间 1258 次反向拆股的样本,我们对比了出于不同原因启动反向拆股的公司的收益管理。文献表明,反向拆股的动机因公司股价范围而异。因此,我们使用拆分前股价和目标股价范围将样本分为三组。我们发现,这些组别在酌情应计方面存在明显差异。以往的研究将盈利管理和反向拆分视为替代品,而我们的假设是,面临退市风险的公司可能会将这两种机制视为互补品。与这一假设相一致的是,我们发现对于拆分前价格低于 1 美元的公司,反向拆分与拆分后全权应计制之间存在很强的正相关关系。我们的研究结果对投资者有两个重要影响:(i) 反向拆股背后动机不同的公司表现出不同的收益管理行为;(ii) 可能面临交易所退市的公司在反向拆股的同时使用酌情应计制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Earnings management around reverse stock splits

Utilizing a sample of 1258 reverse stock splits from 1988 to 2019, we contrast earnings management by firms that initiate reverse splits for diverse reasons. Literature suggests that the incentives for reverse splits vary based on firms' stock price ranges. As such, we use the pre-split and target-price ranges to separate the sample into three groups. We find a stark difference in discretionary accruals across these groups. While previous studies have treated earnings management and reverse splits as substitutes, we hypothesize that firms at risk of delisting may employ these two mechanisms as complements. Consistent with the hypothesis, we document a strong positive association between reverse splits and post-split discretionary accruals for firms with pre-split prices below $1. This relationship, however, is non-existent among the remaining two groups. Our findings have two important implications for investors: (i) firms with different motives behind reverse splits exhibit different earnings management behavior and (ii) firms that are likely facing exchange delisting use discretionary accruals in complement with reverse stock splits.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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