行为的道义至上?

IF 1.6 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.5840/jphil20231201030

Andrew T. Forcehimes

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引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么我们应该做我们应该做的事?我们可以对这个问题的不同答案进行分类，这取决于他们是否认为支配行为的应该是由支配不作为的应该来解释的。在这篇文章中，我展示了一些来自规范伦理学、道德心理学和行为哲学的貌似合理的主张是如何得出这样的结论的:一个行为人应该做什么，是由她应该拥有的态度来解释的。

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The Deontic Primacy of Actions?

Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.

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来源期刊

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： To publish philosophical articles of current interest and encourage the interchange of ideas, especially the exploration of the borderline between philosophy and other disciplines.