税务审计是稻草人:来自大规模实地实验的证据

IF 5.6 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Journal-Economic Policy Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI:10.1257/pol.20200321

Marcelo Bergolo, Rodrigo Ceni, Guillermo Cruces, Matias Giaccobasso, Ricardo Perez-Truglia

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引用次数: 2

摘要

阿林厄姆和桑德莫(1972)的典型模型预测，企业通过在逃税的成本和收益之间进行最佳权衡来逃税。然而，没有直接证据表明公司对审计的反应是这样的。为了解决这个问题，我们与一家税务机关合作进行了一次大规模的实地实验。我们致函20440家中小企业，这些企业每年纳税总额超过2亿美元。我们发现，提供审计信息会显著影响税务合规，但其方式与阿林厄姆和桑德莫(1972)不一致。(jel c93, d22, h25, h26, k34, l25, o14)

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Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment

The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)

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来源期刊

American Economic Journal-Economic Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

8.20

自引率

1.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) is a general-interest economics journal. The journal publishes 12 issues containing articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in economics. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy publishes papers covering a range of topics, the common theme being the role of economic policy in economic outcomes. Subject areas include public economics; urban and regional economics; public policy aspects of health, education, welfare and political institutions; law and economics; economic regulation; and environmental and natural resource economics.