{"title":"localcat: CAN总线攻击类型的低开销分类","authors":"Caio Batista de Melo;Nikil Dutt","doi":"10.1109/LES.2023.3299217","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although research has shown vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the controller area network bus (CAN bus) and proposed alternatives, the CAN bus protocol is still the industry standard and present in most vehicles. Due to its vulnerability to potential intruders that can hinder execution or even take control of the vehicles, much work has focused on detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. However, most literature does not provide mechanisms to reason about, or respond to the attacks so that the system can continue to execute safely despite the intruder. This letter proposes a low-overhead methodology to automatically classify intrusions into predefined types once detected. Our framework: 1) groups messages of the same attacks into blocks; 2) extracts relevant features from each block; and 3) predicts the type of attack using a lightweight classifier model. The initial models depicted in this letter show an accuracy of up to 99.16% within the first 50 ms of the attack, allowing the system to quickly react to the intrusion before the malicious actor can conclude their attack. We believe this letter lays the groundwork for vehicles to have specialized runtime reactions based on the attack type.","PeriodicalId":56143,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters","volume":"15 4","pages":"178-181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=10261979","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"LOCoCAT: Low-Overhead Classification of CAN Bus Attack Types\",\"authors\":\"Caio Batista de Melo;Nikil Dutt\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LES.2023.3299217\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Although research has shown vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the controller area network bus (CAN bus) and proposed alternatives, the CAN bus protocol is still the industry standard and present in most vehicles. Due to its vulnerability to potential intruders that can hinder execution or even take control of the vehicles, much work has focused on detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. However, most literature does not provide mechanisms to reason about, or respond to the attacks so that the system can continue to execute safely despite the intruder. This letter proposes a low-overhead methodology to automatically classify intrusions into predefined types once detected. Our framework: 1) groups messages of the same attacks into blocks; 2) extracts relevant features from each block; and 3) predicts the type of attack using a lightweight classifier model. The initial models depicted in this letter show an accuracy of up to 99.16% within the first 50 ms of the attack, allowing the system to quickly react to the intrusion before the malicious actor can conclude their attack. We believe this letter lays the groundwork for vehicles to have specialized runtime reactions based on the attack type.\",\"PeriodicalId\":56143,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters\",\"volume\":\"15 4\",\"pages\":\"178-181\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=10261979\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10261979/\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10261979/","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
LOCoCAT: Low-Overhead Classification of CAN Bus Attack Types
Although research has shown vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the controller area network bus (CAN bus) and proposed alternatives, the CAN bus protocol is still the industry standard and present in most vehicles. Due to its vulnerability to potential intruders that can hinder execution or even take control of the vehicles, much work has focused on detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. However, most literature does not provide mechanisms to reason about, or respond to the attacks so that the system can continue to execute safely despite the intruder. This letter proposes a low-overhead methodology to automatically classify intrusions into predefined types once detected. Our framework: 1) groups messages of the same attacks into blocks; 2) extracts relevant features from each block; and 3) predicts the type of attack using a lightweight classifier model. The initial models depicted in this letter show an accuracy of up to 99.16% within the first 50 ms of the attack, allowing the system to quickly react to the intrusion before the malicious actor can conclude their attack. We believe this letter lays the groundwork for vehicles to have specialized runtime reactions based on the attack type.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Embedded Systems Letters (ESL), provides a forum for rapid dissemination of latest technical advances in embedded systems and related areas in embedded software. The emphasis is on models, methods, and tools that ensure secure, correct, efficient and robust design of embedded systems and their applications.