Total pragmatic encroachment and belief–desire psychology

Abstract Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology is the idea that whether one knows some proposition depends on whether one can rely on it practically. Total pragmatic encroachment affirms that practical considerations of this sort encroach not just on knowledge but on all interesting normative epistemic statuses a belief might have. Ichikawa, Jarvis, and Rubin (2012) have argued that this stronger thesis conflicts with mainstream belief‐desire psychology. Worse still, they argue that attempting to defend the thesis gets one caught in vicious circularities. The aim of this paper is to show that, if we are careful in how we understand the key idea of being sensitive to practical considerations , we can defend total pragmatic encroachment and avoid the circularities. In fact, depending on how it is understood, we can even square mainstream belief‐desire psychology with total pragmatic encroachment as well.