Intuitions and theories of reference

In this paper, I am presenting Devitt?s Expertise Defence and the Modest Theory of Intuitions as a response to Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich?s claims that the method of cases is flawed and that we should consult folk intuitions in supporting theories of reference, which they in turn support by experimental data that referential intuitions differ cross-culturally. Some authors present Devitt?s response and his own project as an attempt to keep a moderate position between armchair philosophy and experimental philosophy that Machery et al. advocate, as he defends the position that although intuitions are not universally reliable, experts? intuitions are more reliable and could potentially be used for supporting adequate theories. In turn, I will try to show why Devitt?s Expertise Defence should only be considered as a negative project aimed at criticising both armchair and experimental philosophy based on testing folk intuitions, and why he does not have to fully justify the Modest Theory of Intuitions, and that is sufficient to introduce it as a further alternative in order to successfully object to mentioned styles of philosophy. I will support this view by using Ramsey and Cummins?s objections against the possibility of establishing a proper account of the reliability of any kind of intuitions. In the end, I will consider Devitt?s request to test language usage and to explore linguistic reality in theorising about language as the only proper part of his positive program and reconsider the role of philosophy of language that is forbidden to rely on intuitions.