成本(在)有效的公共物品提供:一个实验性的探索

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI:10.1007/s11238-023-09956-6

Nathan W. Chan, Stephen Knowles, Ronald Peeters, Leonard Wolk

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文研究了公共物品成本有效捐赠的决定因素。我们进行了一项预先注册的实验，以阐明在一个新的公共产品博弈中，制度和个人层面的因素如何影响个人贡献以及这些贡献的成本效益。特别是，我们研究了相应的不确定性对公共产品贡献价值的作用(制度层面)，以及个人特征，如风险和模糊性态度，捐赠类型和人口统计学(个人层面)。我们发现所有机构都存在成本无效贡献，但各机构的总贡献水平和成本无效程度是相似的。同时，成本效益随捐赠类型的不同而变化——这是一个与我们从理论中得出的假设相一致的新结果——但其他个体特征对捐赠的成本效益影响不大。我们的工作对现实世界中的慈善捐赠和公共物品提供具有重要的积极和规范意义，尤其与新兴的在线众筹和赞助平台密切相关，这些平台使用户面临着大量竞争的捐赠机会。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Cost-(in)effective public good provision: an experimental exploration

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Cost-(in)effective public good provision: an experimental exploration

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as individual characteristics like risk and ambiguity attitudes, giving type, and demographics (individual level). We find cost-ineffective contributions in all institutions, but total contribution levels and the degree of cost-ineffectiveness are similar across institutions. Meanwhile, cost-effectiveness varies by giving type—which is a novel result that is consistent with hypotheses we generate from theory—but other individual characteristics have little influence on the cost-effectiveness of contributions. Our work has important positive and normative implications for charitable giving and public good provision in the real world, and it is particularly germane to emerging online crowdfunding and patronage platforms that confront users with a multitude of competing opportunities for giving.

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来源期刊

Theory and Decision Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The field of decision has been investigated from many sides. However, research programs relevant to decision making in psychology, management science, economics, the theory of games, statistics, operations research, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and analytical philosophy have remained separate. Theory and Decision is devoted to all aspects of decision making belonging to such programs, but addresses also possible cross-fertilizations between these disciplines which would represent effective advances in knowledge. The purpose of the journal is to let the engineering of choice gradually emerge both for individual and for collective decision making. Formalized treatments will be favoured, to the extent that they provide new insights into the issues raised and an appropriate modeling of the situation considered. Due to its growing importance, expermentation in decision making as well as its links to the cognitive sciences will be granted special attention by Theory and Decision. Of particular interest are: Preference and belief modeling, Experimental decision making under risk or under uncertainty, Decision analysis, multicriteria decision modeling, Game theory, negotiation theory, collective decision making, social choice, Rationality, cognitive processes and interactive decision making, Methodology of the decision sciences. Applications to various problems in management and organization science, economics and finance, computer-supported decision schemes, will be welcome as long as they bear on sufficiently general cases. Analysis of actual decision making processes are also relevant topics for the journal, whether pertaining to individual, collective or negotiatory approaches; to private decisions or public policies; to operations or to strategic choices. Officially cited as: Theory Decis