组织中的权责捆绑

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Susheng Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

决策权往往与问责制捆绑在一起。决策者通常要对失败负责。我们提出了一种不完全契约方法来研究四种问责制度:个人问责制、无问责制、集体问责制和反向问责制。我们考虑了一个由收入、权力和责任三种分配所定义的组织。这些分配是内生的,在均衡状态下共同决定。我们的主要发现有(1) 在均衡状态下,权力和责任通常是捆绑在一起的,但并非总是如此;(2) 个人责任和集体责任同样有效,无责任和反向责任同样有效;(3) 如果权力相当大,无责任可能是最优的;(4) 控制权往往分配给个人利益和控制权边际成本相对较小的管理者;(5) 反向责任一般不如个人责任,但如果权力相当大,其边际成本和个人利益足够小,反向责任可能是最优的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations

Decision-making authority is often bundled with accountability. Decision makers are usually made accountable for failure. We propose an incomplete-contract approach to investigate four accountability systems: personal accountability, no accountability, collective accountability, and reverse accountability. We consider an organization defined by three assignments: income, authority, and accountability. These assignments are endogenously and jointly determined in equilibrium. Our main findings are: (1) authority and accountability are usually, but not always, bundled in equilibrium; (2) personal accountability and collective accountability are equally efficient, and no accountability and reverse accountability are equally efficient; (3) no accountability can be optimal if the authority is quite capable; (4) control tends to be assigned to managers whose personal benefit from and the marginal cost of control are relatively small; and (5) reverse accountability is generally inferior to personal accountability, but it can be optimal if the authority is quite capable and her marginal cost and personal benefit from control are sufficiently small.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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