理性信念,反思,和削弱的失败

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY
Frank Hofmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

哲学家们对理性的反思作用存在分歧,理性被理解为(适当地)回应真实的、规范的原因的能力。在这里,“反思”是指自我意识规范性元认知的能力。这篇文章发展并拒绝了一个新颖的论点-来自削弱失败者的论点-支持“单一层次观点”,认为拥有信念(和理由)的概念对于回应理由是必要的。“两层观点”允许理性主体只能对理性做出非反思性反应,它得到了对理性行为的理性反应角色的考虑的支持。理性并不像单一层次的观点所希望的那样统一。我们从理性形成信念的非反思方式开始,然后成长为反思方式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rational Belief, Reflection, and Undercutting Defeat
Abstract Philosophers disagree about the role of reflection for rationality, understood as the capacity to (properly) respond to genuine, normative reasons. Here, ‘reflection’ means the capacity for self-conscious normative meta-cognition. This article develops and rejects a novel argument – the argument from undercutting defeaters – in favor of the ‘one-level view’ that holds that having the concept of a belief (and of a reason) is necessary for responding to reasons. It will be argued that the ‘two-level view’, which allows for rational subjects that can only non-reflectively respond to reasons, is supported by considerations dealing with the role of responding to reasons for rational action. Rationality is not as unified as the one-level view wants to have it. We start with the non-reflective way of rationally forming beliefs and then grow into the reflective way.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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