{"title":"真正的未来:几个案例研究","authors":"Torben Braüner","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7858","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we compare Arthur Prior’s well-known Ockhamistic semantics to an alternative semantics for future contingents. We show that the alternative semantics is able to distinguish between two different statements about counterfactual future possibilities, which are equivalent according to Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"16 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The True Futures: A Couple of Case Studies\",\"authors\":\"Torben Braüner\",\"doi\":\"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7858\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we compare Arthur Prior’s well-known Ockhamistic semantics to an alternative semantics for future contingents. We show that the alternative semantics is able to distinguish between two different statements about counterfactual future possibilities, which are equivalent according to Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":471511,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logic and Philosophy of Time\",\"volume\":\"16 6\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logic and Philosophy of Time\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7858\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7858","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we compare Arthur Prior’s well-known Ockhamistic semantics to an alternative semantics for future contingents. We show that the alternative semantics is able to distinguish between two different statements about counterfactual future possibilities, which are equivalent according to Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics.