军队与影响:外交政策的精英经验与公众舆论

IF 2.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Tyler Jost, Joshua D. Kertzer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

什么时候公众更有可能在外交政策上服从精英?现有的研究表明,公众会从同党中获得线索,但是当同党不同意时会发生什么呢?我们认为,公众服从那些先前的经验表明其专业知识和良好意图的精英。因此,拥有受社会尊敬的机构背景的精英是特别有力的暗示者,即使这些机构的核心竞争力与手头的问题没有直接关系。通过两个联合实验,我们发现,美国公众通常会听从经验更丰富的精英,但对在可信机构有经验的精英尤其恭敬:公众更听从有军事背景的精英,即使在考虑非军事问题时也是如此。该理论和研究结果表明,精英们过去所处的位置决定了他们上台后所拥有的权力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Armies and Influence: Elite Experience and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy
When is the public more likely to defer to elites on foreign policy? Existing research suggests the public takes its cues from co-partisans, but what happens when co-partisans disagree? We argue that the public defers to elites whose prior experiences signal expertise and favorable intentions. Elites with backgrounds in socially esteemed institutions are thus especially powerful cue-givers, even when the core competencies of those institutions are not directly related to the issue at hand. Using two conjoint experiments, we find that the American public defers to more experienced elites generally, but is especially deferential toward elites with experience in trusted institutions: the public defers more to elites with military backgrounds, even when considering non-military issues. The theory and findings suggest that where elites sat in the past shapes how much power they wield once standing in office.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
9.70%
发文量
101
期刊介绍: The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary journal of social scientific theory and research on human conflict. It focuses especially on international conflict, but its pages are open to a variety of contributions about intergroup conflict, as well as between nations, that may help in understanding problems of war and peace. Reports about innovative applications, as well as basic research, are welcomed, especially when the results are of interest to scholars in several disciplines.
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