CEO权力与战略会计财务专家向审计委员会的选择

IF 3.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Anna Bedford, Samir Ghannam, Matthew Grosse, Nelson Ma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了CEO权力在任命会计财务专家(AFEs)到事务所审计委员会中的作用。我们的研究结果表明,拥有强大ceo的公司任命afe进入审计委员会的可能性较低。此外,那些经验丰富、地位高、独立于ceo的高效副总裁,不太可能在拥有强大ceo的公司中被任命。在有权势的首席执行官在场的情况下,有效的afe也不太可能被指定为审计委员会主席。有效财务报表的缺乏与强大的首席执行官使用会计自由裁量权来达到或仅仅超过分析师的盈利预测有关。我们没有发现证据表明,afe会选择避免在拥有强大ceo的公司的董事会任职。我们的研究结果与《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》通过非正式渠道(包括他们与提名委员会的社会关系)影响董事会任命的事实一致。我们的研究结果表明,现行法规禁止CEO参与董事提名过程,并规定谁有资格成为财务专家,可能不足以确保审计委员会的有效性和财务报告质量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

CEO power and the strategic selection of accounting financial experts to the audit committee

CEO power and the strategic selection of accounting financial experts to the audit committee

We examine the role of CEO power in the appointment of accounting financial experts (AFEs) to firm audit committees. Our results show that firms with powerful CEOs have a lower likelihood of appointing AFEs to their audit committees. In addition, effective AFEs—those characterized by experience, high status, and social independence from the CEO—are less likely to be appointed in firms with powerful CEOs. In the presence of powerful CEOs, effective AFEs are also less likely to be designated audit committee chair. The absence of effective AFEs is associated with the use of accounting discretion by powerful CEOs to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts. We find no evidence that AFEs choose to avoid serving on the boards of firms with powerful CEOs. Our findings are consistent with powerful CEOs influencing board appointments post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act through informal channels, including through their social ties with nominating committees. Our results suggest that current regulations prohibiting CEO involvement in the director nomination process and specifying who qualifies as a financial expert may be insufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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