Identity politics and the democratization of democracy: Oscillations between power and reason in radical democratic and standpoint theory

Criticism against identity politics, both in public discourse and political theory, has intensified over the past decade with the rise of right-wing populism and the polarization of politics (Walters, 2018). Such criticism portrays identity politics as a threat to democracy, alleging that it erodes community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on radical democratic and standpoint theories, I argue for the opposite thesis; namely, that identity politics is crucial for the democratization of democracy. I show that democratization works through disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power; and that such power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. In other words, the universal democratic claims of equality and freedom can only become effective through their repeated actualization in particular power struggles.

Identity politics is a contested term. Nevertheless, there are systematic overlaps between current criticisms of identity politics that mainly repeat arguments that have been similarly articulated since the 1990s. Communitarians criticize identity politics as dividing the political community, liberals criticize it as disruptive of the public sphere and free deliberation (Fukuyama, 2018; Habermas, 2020; Lilla, 2017), and Marxist and anarchist theorists argue that identity politics undermines the struggle for justice and emancipation and stabilizes state power through neoliberal diversity politics (Fraser, 1990, 2007; Kumar et al., 2018; Newman, 2010; Táíwò, 2022; for a critique of these debates, see Bickford, 1997; Walters, 2018; Young, 2000, pp. 82−87; Paul, 2019). Based on universalist accounts of the political,¹ all three positions share the concern that particularist identity politics conflates social positions with epistemological possibilities and political positions, resulting in standpoint fundamentalism. In other words, the critics claim that, in identity politics, it matters more who speaks than what is said.²

Discussions about difference (Benhabib, 1996), counterpublics (Fraser, 1990), and inclusion (Young, 2000) at the intersection of deliberative and Critical theory early criticized such universalist accounts of the political for their exclusionist effects. While these works offer valuable resources to construct the argument that strengthening identity politics is important for the development of more inclusive deliberations and institutions, they frame this as a correction of reason, leaving the aspect of power underdeveloped. To understand both the severe resistance against more inclusive politics and the strategic need for non-deliberative means to achieve it—such as protest, civil disobedience, “cancel culture,” or uprising—what is necessary is a theoretical framework that describes democratization as an oscillation between power and reason. Even Mansbridge (1996) does not offer such a theoretical framework, despite explicitly arguing—contrary to deliberative democracy—that power through coercion is central for democracy and rightly points to the need for “protected enclaves” (p. 57) for the development of minoritarian standpoints. As the tension between power and reason, and respectively, particularism and universalism, is at the center of agonistic³ radical democratic theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Lefort, 1988a; Mouffe, 2008; Rancière, 1999), it is better suited to develop such a framework than deliberative approaches.⁴

This tension should not be understood as one where identity politics is positioned on the side of particularism and its critics on the side of universality; rather, it is constitutive of identity politics, and in extension, democracy itself. “Identity politics”—in the sense of the history of the term's origin as well as the current debate—refers to the political practice of marginalized groups who, in relation to the construction of a collective identity and standpoint, defend themselves against their disadvantages due to structures, cultures, and norms of the majority society. Following Combahee River Collective (1979, p. 365), a Black feminist organization, identity politics can be defined as “focusing upon our own oppression,” thus starting from particular experiences and standpoints. However, this should not be conflated—as some contemporary critics do—with essentialist interest group politics. Rather, identity politics is directed against oppression in general, insofar as it is an intersectional and “integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking” (Combahee River Collective, 1979, p. 362). This oscillation between particularist and universalist accounts of oppression is not a flaw in the Collective's text but stems from the inherent tension within identity politics. This tension has been discussed in the rich debates on identity politics, especially in the writings of intersectional feminism (Alcoff, 1988; Alcoff et al., 2006; Bickford, 1997; Briskin, 1990; Gamson, 1995; Hekman, 1999; Kruks, 1995; McNay, 2010; Nicholson, 2008; Whittier, 2017; see also the edited volumes, Benhabib et al., 1995; Hames-Garcia & Moya, 2000; and for an overview, see Bernstein, 2005; as well as Heyes, 2020). However, there is no systematic account of the tension between particularism and universalism in these works, which, indebted to that tradition, I will develop with the aim of strengthening it.

As “identity politics” is a contested term, alternative conceptual strategies exist. For example, Young (2000) speaks of the “politics of difference” of “structural social groups” to describe what I call “identity politics,” while, following critics (pp. 82–87), she uses the term “identity politics” for the tendency toward substantialist, merely cultural, and potentially non-intersectional exclusive group-interest politics (p. 86). As the common understanding of “identity politics” entails the breadth of the critical politics of marginalized groups, I think it is important to defend, specify, and revive that term, instead of trying to establish a new term that is not currently criticized. This conceptual strategy underscores that, in general, the critical politics of marginalized groups promote democratization and inclusivity. This, of course, does not mean that all identity politics are equally democratizing. The argument is thus not a carte blanche for every practice of identity politics; rather, the reconstruction of the democratizing function of identity politics is not only descriptive but also normative, as it allows a differentiation of identity politics from exclusive group-interest politics and thereby criticizes identity political projects if they show tendencies to develop into exclusive group-interest politics.

To understand identity politics as a democratizing oscillation between power and reason, the radical democratic account has to be refined through standpoint theory. I will proceed in the following steps. First, I will systematically reconstruct the equivalences of both theoretical traditions, filling a gap in the existing research literature that is ignorant of these equivalences. Both put forward a critique of common notions of objectivity and universality, privileging the particularity of oppressed knowledges.⁵ In contrast to the communitarian, liberal, and Marxist accounts that are based on universalist conceptions of the political, these traditions argue that breaking through established understandings of universal discourse through the use of particular identity politics is central to the further democratization of democracy. However, the radical democratic affirmation of identity politics as a particular disruption of the universal prima facie confirms the critics’ fear that identity politics destroys universal normativity and with it the very foundation of democracy, by fostering exclusive group-interest politics. This points to a more fundamental problem in radical democratic thought, which Volk (2018) recently called a lack of consensus orientation. If politics is only conceptualized as critique, disruption, and protest, this amounts to a rather one-sided account of politics that blends out the importance of institutions and deliberation. Thus, while radical democratic theory helps to understand that the tension between universalism and particularism is constitutive of democracy and identity politics, it risks resolving this tension toward particularism by overemphasizing power instead of reason as definitive of the political. It is, therefore, necessary to correct its lack of consensus orientation to develop the radical democratic account of identity politics.

To this end, in the second section, I demonstrate how standpoint theory refines the radical democratic interpretation of identity politics. This addresses the concerns that identity politics undermines intersubjective discourse and offers a solution to the lack of consensus orientation in radical democratic theory in general.⁶ Standpoint theory allows a substantiation and reconciliation of two claims that are contradictory at first sight. First, that particular standpoints are necessary to criticize the current discursive and institutional order, and second, that such standpoints are based on intersubjective reason and “strong objectivity” (Harding, 1993). This helps to clarify the democratizing function of identity politics and the normativity of radical democratic theory in order to criticize interpretations of this school that reject any claims to objectivity based on the fundamental contingency of the political. Such a total rejection of objectivity is the philosophical basis for the aforementioned lack of consensus orientation in radical democratic thought, leading to dissolving the power/reason tension toward power. The radical democratic and standpoint theoretical interpretation of identity politics that I propose thereby explains that the ongoing oscillation between power and reason, respectively, particularism and universalism, is constitutive of identity politics, and by extension, of democracy.

The radical democratic and standpoint theoretical account of identity politics that I propose shows that particularistic identity politics is necessary for the democratization of democracy. Through the communicative disruption of neutrality, identity politics reconstitutes the space for deliberation. This is a matter of both reason and power, as strong objectivity produces intersubjectively understandable knowledge about social oppression, which nevertheless often requires force—such as protest, uprising, and de-platforming—to break through structures of epistemic ignorance.

As a universally inclusive order is impossible and concrete interpretations of reason will continue to be contested, democratization is a dynamic process that will not come to a halt. Therefore, the tension between the two poles of particularity and universality, and respectively, power and reason, cannot be resolved. The ongoing oscillation between particularism and universalism is a necessary feature of democratization through identity politics. Political theory needs to account for it instead of attempting to resolve it by a reduction to universalism—as in today's critics of identity politics—or by a reduction to particularism, as the emphasis on contingency and power in radical democratic theory could prima facie imply.

Of course, not all types of identity politics are equally democratizing. The conception is thus not a carte blanche for every practice of identity politics. While nationalist, right wing, or trans-exclusionary radical feminist demands can be categorized as exclusive group-interest politics that defy democratic universalism, in other cases the differentiation between democratizing identity politics and exclusive group-interest politics is more contested. This, however, is not a problem for the radical democratic account, but rather confirms it. To conceptualize identity politics as an oscillation between particularism and universalism already implies that struggles within identity politics over what is democratizing will continue, and that specific identity political practices might turn out to be wrong. Much of the rich theoretical debate around identity politics (see Introduction), which is part of identity political reason, deals with the problem of how to differentiate exclusive from emancipative forms of identity politics. The normativity, articulated by the radical democratic and standpoint theoretical account of identity politics, confirms and refines these identity political discussions: identity politics is democratizing if it works toward equality and freedom for all, which entails working toward intersectionality and inclusivity instead of naturalizing and essentialist accounts within identity political projects. Nevertheless, the pressing problem of contemporary politics is not the sometimes-difficult evaluation of specific identity political practices, but the universalist rejection of identity politics as a whole.

The first step for a political theory of identity politics is to make clear that identity politics, in general, is necessary for democratization, which I have attempted to do. This allows for further inquiries into the democratizing potential of different forms of identity politics. While such inquiries are needed in order to not fall back on the side of particularity by simply supporting all identity politics without differentiation—that is, without critique through reason—it also risks falling back into a universalist critique. Defining narrowly what democratizing identity politics has to look like implies rejecting the privileging of particular knowledges by judging them through a universalist political theory. It would disregard the key insight of the radical democratic and standpoint theoretical approach to identity politics: that the normative democratic principles of equality and freedom need continuous actualization and concretizing through identity political practice. In other words, further research on different forms of identity politics needs to account for the ongoing oscillation between particularism and universalism. This means to take seriously that identity political knowledges might be able to reach a “stronger objectivity” than hegemonic knowledge and to exert epistemic modesty by taking into account one's own entanglement in this hegemonic knowledge.