重新审视家庭对家族企业绩效的影响

IF 3.4 3区管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT

European Management Review Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI:10.1111/emre.12606

Peter Jaskiewicz, James G. Combs, Klaus Uhlenbruck, Amlan Datta

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引用次数: 0

摘要

家族所有者对管理者进行监督，可以减少委托代理冲突，提高公司业绩。然而，家族所有者也会侵占资源，造成委托代理冲突，损害公司业绩。虽然这些影响同时存在，但研究并未解释何时其中一种影响大于另一种影响。我们的理论是，当家族在董事会中的参与度与其所有权成正比时，代理成本会降到最低；董事会参与度太低会加剧委托代理冲突，而参与度太高则会加剧委托人与委托人之间的冲突。与我们的理论相一致，来自法国面板数据的证据显示，随着家族董事会参与度和家族所有权的共同提高，公司业绩也会提高，而当家族董事会参与度和家族所有权成正比时，公司业绩会最大化。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Revisiting the impact of families on family firm performance

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Revisiting the impact of families on family firm performance

Family owners monitor managers, attenuating principal–agent conflicts and improving firm performance. However, family owners also appropriate resources, creating principal–principal conflicts that harm firm performance. Although these effects occur simultaneously, research does not explain when one outweighs the other. We theorize that agency costs are minimized when the family's involvement on the board of directors is proportional to its ownership; too little board involvement fuels principal–agent conflicts, and too much fuels principal–principal conflicts. Consistent with our theorizing, evidence from French panel data shows firm performance increases as family board involvement and family ownership jointly increase, and performance is maximized when family board involvement and family ownership are proportional.

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来源期刊

European Management Review MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

7.20

自引率

13.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The European Management Review is an international journal dedicated to advancing the understanding of management in private and public sector organizations through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis. The European Management Review provides an international forum for dialogue between researchers, thereby improving the understanding of the nature of management in different settings and promoting the transfer of research results to management practice. Although one of the European Management Review"s aims is to foster the general advancement of management scholarship among European scholars and/or those academics interested in European management issues.