{"title":"多对一市场中的搜索摩擦*","authors":"Menghan Xu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12357","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets*\",\"authors\":\"Menghan Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/joie.12357\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47963,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Industrial Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Industrial Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12357\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Industrial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12357","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.
期刊介绍:
First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.