全球传染风险与IMF信贷周期:紧急出口和旋转门

IF 3.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Stephen B. Kaplan, Sujeong Shim
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么国际货币基金组织(IMF)在成员国解决其金融危机之前退出其贷款关系?考虑到IMF经常在退出后不久就恢复贷款,这一点尤其令人惊讶。我们认为,从IMF撤资取决于全球传染风险。国际货币基金组织维持全球金融稳定的使命与其有限的财政资源之间的紧张关系,迫使该组织提前退出其贷款关系。在全球危机高度蔓延的时期,IMF优先考虑自己的职责,在不遵守规定的情况下继续放贷。然而,当国际货币基金组织认为传染风险最小时,它会关注道德风险,并愿意切断贷款联系,以维护其声誉和资源,以应对未来的危机。通过对IMF在阿根廷和希腊这两个最大借款国的决策进行比较分析,我们找到了支持我们观点的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Global contagion risk and IMF credit cycles: Emergency exits and revolving doors
Abstract Why does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exit its lending relationships before member states have resolved their financial crises? It is particularly surprising given that the IMF often resumes its lending shortly after its withdrawal. We argue that IMF withdrawals are conditioned by global contagion risk. The tension between the IMF's mandate of global financial stability and its limited financial resources compels the IMF's early exit from its lending relationships. During periods of high global contagion, the IMF prioritizes its mandate by continuing its lending despite noncompliance. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, and willingly cuts its lending ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative analysis of IMF decision‐making in two of its largest borrowers, Argentina and Greece, we find supportive evidence for our claims.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Regulation & Governance serves as the leading platform for the study of regulation and governance by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, historians, criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists and others. Research on regulation and governance, once fragmented across various disciplines and subject areas, has emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic change in the social sciences. Through the peer-reviewed journal Regulation & Governance, we seek to advance discussions between various disciplines about regulation and governance, promote the development of new theoretical and empirical understanding, and serve the growing needs of practitioners for a useful academic reference.
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