Book Review: The Popes Against the Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy by Kevin Madigan

America’s economic and financial position. Blaming competitors, disputes about monetary and economic matters assumed ‘an exceptional viciousness and were conducted in highly nationalistic terms hitherto unheard of among the transatlantic partners’ (261). In this context, Nixon’s preoccupation with re-election during his first term in office further contributed to worsening relations, as did the ongoing Vietnam War, especially Europe’s furious response to the 1972 Christmas bombing campaign. In 1973 Kissinger delivered a speech, ‘Year of Europe’, intended to improve relations. It didn’t. European leaders considered his proposed Atlantic Charter as condescending and aimed at undermining and preventing further European integration. The October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states caused further disruption to relations. These were considerably worsened when later that month a small committee of the National Security Council put all US nuclear forces on global alert, DEFCON III, the same level of alert that had occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. France and the UK, NATO’s other nuclear powers, were not consulted. Nor was NATO informed until European leaders heard about it the next day. Despite vigorous protests, the US remained unapologetic. Europe was shocked that amid a global crisis the US took such an extraordinary and reckless measure. European trust and confidence in US leadership was shaken. Nonetheless, as Larres makes crystal clear, the fact was that however upset Europeans were, there was little they could do. They lacked the required unity and strength, especially in the security realm, to challenge American hegemony. The signing of a new Atlantic Charter some months later marked European acceptance of US authority over the Atlantic alliance. Larres persuasively argues that despite Nixon and Kissinger’s constructive détente policies towards the communist bloc, they were determined to maintain full control of the western alliance. They re-asserted a transatlantic alliance operated on a basis of subservience rather than equality or mutual respect. Today’s global crisis confirms the extent to which Washington continues ‘to insist on a pliant and domesticated Europe that pa[ys] its dues and follow[s] US policies and its guidance and advice without asking too many, if any, critical questions’ (272). Larres’ excellent scholarship presents telling insights into American attitudes toward Europe and European responses. A must-read for students, it will be of interest to all parties concerned about the direction of Europe in today’s world. Highly recommended.