{"title":"股权分置改革后中国上市公司高管股权激励水平影响因素实证研究","authors":"Huihui Yang, Wenlei Ge","doi":"10.1109/ICIII.2008.59","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.","PeriodicalId":185591,"journal":{"name":"2008 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Empirical Study on Factors of Executive Equity Incentive Levels-Based on Listed Companies in China after Equity Division Reform\",\"authors\":\"Huihui Yang, Wenlei Ge\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICIII.2008.59\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.\",\"PeriodicalId\":185591,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2008 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2008 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIII.2008.59\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2008 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIII.2008.59","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical Study on Factors of Executive Equity Incentive Levels-Based on Listed Companies in China after Equity Division Reform
We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.