监管机构的独立性、问责制和感知质量

Chris J. Hanretty, Pierre Larouche, Andreas P. Reindl
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在网络产业(电子通信、能源和其他)的自由化过程中,国家监管当局(NRAs)的具体欧盟模式已经形成。它基于两大原则:nra是独立的、负责任的。CERRE关于国家监管机构(NRAs)独立性和问责制的报告为该模型提供了实证支持,该报告使用了来自三个部门(能源、电信和铁路)加上国家竞争机构和五个成员国(比利时、荷兰、法国、德国和英国)的nra样本。在他们的报告中,欧洲经济研究中心的研究人员编制了一个独立指数,对市场政党,最重要的是对立法和行政权力。他们还制定了一个新的问责指数,其中包括界定对市场各方、立法和行政权力、欧洲委员会、法院和同行问责的主要因素。然后将这两个指数与nra工作的感知质量指数进行分析。CERRE报告显示,欧盟模式是有效的:越独立、越负责任,人们对质量的感知就越好。它还纠正了一些常见的误解:欧盟模式不仅仅是NRAs的独立性,它还要求问责制。此外,独立性和问责制并不一定相互矛盾。他们是可以和解的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Independence, Accountability and Perceived Quality of Regulators
A specific EU model for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) has evolved in the course of the liberalization processes in network industries (electronic communications, energy and others). It rests on two broad lines: NRAs are independent and accountable.The CERRE Report on Independence and Accountability of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) provides empirical backing for that model, using a sample of NRAs from three sectors (energy, telecommunications and rail) plus the national competition authorities, and five member states (Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany and the United Kingdom).In their report, CERRE researchers compile an index of independence, towards market parties and most importantly towards the legislative and executive powers. They also develop a new index of accountability, comprising the main elements that define accountability towards market parties, the legislative and executive powers, the European Commission, the courts and peers. These two indexes are then analysed against an index of perceived quality of the work of NRAs.The CERRE Report shows that the EU model works: the more independence and the more accountability, the better the perceived quality.It also corrects some common misunderstandings: the EU model goes beyond independence of NRAs alone, it also requires accountability. Furthermore, independence and accountability do not need to contradict each other. They can be reconciled.
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