Lying for Efficiency or Fairness?

The lies of individuals holding positions of influence in society can result in significant consequences for the distribution of resources. A relationship between lying behavior and social preferences has often been proposed in explaining patterns of lying aversion. However, studies have seldom directly examined the relationship between different types of social preferences and the corresponding lying behaviors. We assess individuals’ preferences over social allocations along with their lying tendencies in the analogous scenarios, using a novel multinomial version of a ‘mind cheating game’, which allows different degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns. Our study allows us to observe how preferences over fairness and efficiency are associated with the willingness to lie for one’s self and others. Selfish and spiteful lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the allocation task, while those subjects with efficiency-oriented preferences tend to tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, among those with a strong preference for fairness in allocations with own-payoff consequence, lying on behalf of fairness concerns is less apparent. Altogether, the empirical patterns suggest that individuals with a strong preference for efficiency in such scenarios are more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with a strong fairness preference may be more likely to lie out of self-interest.