少即是多:概率证明的细化证明

Kunming Jiang, Devora Chait-Roth, Zachary Destefano, Michael Walfish, Thomas Wies
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在过去十年中,人们对概率证明(ip、snark、pcp等)的实现产生了浓厚的兴趣:在这种协议中,不受信任的一方向验证者证明给定的计算是正确执行的,可能是在零知识的情况下。然而,实现仍然不能扩展到小型计算之外。开销的主要来源是前端:将抽象计算转换为一组等价的算术约束。本文介绍了一个通用的框架,叫做蒸馏器,在这个框架中,用户不是将原始计算转换为约束,而是将其抽象规范转换为约束。在这一领域,蒸馏器是第一个以一种可证明是安全的方式执行这种转换的。此外,通过将“在约束中编码检查”的思想发挥到其字面逻辑的极致,蒸馏器揭示了许多减少约束的新机会,从而将基准计算的成本降低了1.3 - 50x,在某些情况下,还获得了更好的渐近性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Less is more: refinement proofs for probabilistic proofs
There has been intense interest over the last decade in implementations of probabilistic proofs (IPs, SNARKs, PCPs, and so on): protocols in which an untrusted party proves to a verifier that a given computation was executed properly, possibly in zero knowledge. Nevertheless, implementations still do not scale beyond small computations. A central source of overhead is the front-end: translating from the abstract computation to a set of equivalent arithmetic constraints. This paper introduces a general-purpose framework, called Distiller, in which a user translates to constraints not the original computation but an abstracted specification of it. Distiller is the first in this area to perform such transformations in a way that is provably safe. Furthermore, by taking the idea of "encode a check in the constraints" to its literal logical extreme, Distiller exposes many new opportunities for constraint reduction, resulting in cost reductions for benchmark computations of 1.3–50×, and in some cases, better asymptotics.
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