The Operation Decisions of Joint Remanufacturing with Cross Trade-in and Capacity Assistance Cooperation

In view of such actual operation situation that OEM-remanufacturer's production capacity and TPR-remanufacturer's recovery capacity are both insufficient, this paper studies the joint remanufacturing problem involving cross trade-in strategy and capacity assistance cooperation. By constructing a Stackelberg game model between the OEM-remanufacturer and TPR-remanufacturer, optimal pricing and production decisions of multiple remanufactured products are explored. Besides, we use simulation cases to analyze the optimal operation plan and further discuss the effect of consumer brand preference on system operations. Results show that under certain conditions, the OEM-remanufacturer and the TPR-remanufacturer can achieve complementary advantages and improve their own profits and the entire supply chain profit through joint remanufacturing with cross trade-in strategy and capacity assistance cooperation; the OEM- and TPR-remanufacturer's cooperation can be effectively promoted by building brand differences in consumer choice for remanufactured products.