双层双通道配送系统两种库存决策模型的比较

Bin Liu, Rong Zhang, Ming Zhu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着互联网在供应链/物流配送系统中的应用越来越多,商业模式正在改变我们的生活。本文研究了两级双渠道分销系统的库存决策模型,该系统由具有互联网渠道的制造商和具有互联网渠道的零售商组成。首先,在中心化的视角下进行联合生产和定价决策,然后在去中心化的系统下,制造商只经营e渠道,零售商经营传统渠道,他们自己的生产/订购和定价都是通过Stackelberg博弈来最大化自己的预期利润。最后,通过对两种决策模型的比较得出了一些结论,其中一个重要的结论是,在价格依赖需求和零售商对传统渠道具有定价权的情况下,由制造商作为Stackelberg博弈领导者设计的特许经销店/两部分资费合同不能保证双渠道系统的协调。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comparison between two inventory decision models for a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system
Business modes have been changing our life with more application of Internet in supply-chain/logistics distribution system. This paper investigates two inventory-decision models of a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system consists of a manufacturer with an Internet-enabled channel at the top echelon and a retailer store at the bottom echelon. Firstly, the joint production and pricing decisions are made with a centralized view, and then under the decentralized system, the manufacturer only operates an E-channel while the retailer operates a traditional channel, their own production/ordering and pricing are made to maximize their own expected profits with a Stackelberg game. Finally, some inferences are developed by comparisons between two decisions models, and a critical conclusion is that, a franchise outlet/two part tariff contract, designed by the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg game leader, can not ensure the coordination of dual-channel system under price-dependent demand and the condition that the retailer has pricing power for traditional channel.
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