{"title":"双层双通道配送系统两种库存决策模型的比较","authors":"Bin Liu, Rong Zhang, Ming Zhu","doi":"10.1109/ICSSSM.2010.5530266","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Business modes have been changing our life with more application of Internet in supply-chain/logistics distribution system. This paper investigates two inventory-decision models of a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system consists of a manufacturer with an Internet-enabled channel at the top echelon and a retailer store at the bottom echelon. Firstly, the joint production and pricing decisions are made with a centralized view, and then under the decentralized system, the manufacturer only operates an E-channel while the retailer operates a traditional channel, their own production/ordering and pricing are made to maximize their own expected profits with a Stackelberg game. Finally, some inferences are developed by comparisons between two decisions models, and a critical conclusion is that, a franchise outlet/two part tariff contract, designed by the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg game leader, can not ensure the coordination of dual-channel system under price-dependent demand and the condition that the retailer has pricing power for traditional channel.","PeriodicalId":409538,"journal":{"name":"2010 7th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comparison between two inventory decision models for a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system\",\"authors\":\"Bin Liu, Rong Zhang, Ming Zhu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICSSSM.2010.5530266\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Business modes have been changing our life with more application of Internet in supply-chain/logistics distribution system. This paper investigates two inventory-decision models of a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system consists of a manufacturer with an Internet-enabled channel at the top echelon and a retailer store at the bottom echelon. Firstly, the joint production and pricing decisions are made with a centralized view, and then under the decentralized system, the manufacturer only operates an E-channel while the retailer operates a traditional channel, their own production/ordering and pricing are made to maximize their own expected profits with a Stackelberg game. Finally, some inferences are developed by comparisons between two decisions models, and a critical conclusion is that, a franchise outlet/two part tariff contract, designed by the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg game leader, can not ensure the coordination of dual-channel system under price-dependent demand and the condition that the retailer has pricing power for traditional channel.\",\"PeriodicalId\":409538,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2010 7th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2010 7th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2010.5530266\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 7th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2010.5530266","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Comparison between two inventory decision models for a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system
Business modes have been changing our life with more application of Internet in supply-chain/logistics distribution system. This paper investigates two inventory-decision models of a two-echelon dual-channel distribution system consists of a manufacturer with an Internet-enabled channel at the top echelon and a retailer store at the bottom echelon. Firstly, the joint production and pricing decisions are made with a centralized view, and then under the decentralized system, the manufacturer only operates an E-channel while the retailer operates a traditional channel, their own production/ordering and pricing are made to maximize their own expected profits with a Stackelberg game. Finally, some inferences are developed by comparisons between two decisions models, and a critical conclusion is that, a franchise outlet/two part tariff contract, designed by the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg game leader, can not ensure the coordination of dual-channel system under price-dependent demand and the condition that the retailer has pricing power for traditional channel.