空间分异下的慈善竞争:分类、拥挤与溢出

Carlo Gallier, T. Goeschl, Martin Kesternich, J. Lohse, Christiane Reif, D. Römer
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引用次数: 6

摘要

我们通过与两个相邻城市的两个食物银行合作,对慈善机构之间的空间差异化竞争进行了研究,并对大约350个捐赠呼吁进行了实地实验。我们通过改变慈善机构位置的可观察性来诱导空间分化,这样每个捐赠者面对一个社会上近的“家”和一个遥远的“远”慈善机构。我们发现,空间差异化竞争具有分类、挤进和不存在溢出效应的特征:捐助者按距离对自己进行分类;为一家慈善机构筹款(通过配对),无论距离远近,都会为该慈善机构筹集善款;但支票簿捐赠给无与伦比的慈善机构不受影响。对于主要捐助者来说,这意味着捐助者和慈善机构之间的社会距离具有有限的战略重要性。对于空间上存在差异的慈善机构,匹配“家庭”捐赠可以使整体慈善收入最大化。然而,这两家慈善机构筹集的额外资金都不足以支付比赛的费用,尽管他们利用了捐赠的社会身份。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers
We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the observability of charities' location such that each donor faces a socially close 'home' and a distant 'away' charity. We find that spatially differentiated competition is characterized by sorting, crowding-in, and an absence of spill-overs: Donors sort themselves by distance; fundraising (through matching) for one charity raises checkbook giving to that charity, irrespective of distance; but checkbook giving to the unmatched charity is not affected. For lead donors, this implies that the social distance between donors and charities is of limited strategic important. For spatially differentiated charities, matching 'home' donations maximizes overall charitable income. Across both charities, however, the additional funds raised fail to cover the cost of the match, despite harnessing social identity for giving.
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