{"title":"运用关键节点假说来解释2011年埃及革命","authors":"Rustam Mussa, Raushan Yesbergen","doi":"10.52123/1994-2370-2021-517","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Our research question involves applying the critical juncture hypothesis formulated by Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors in the series of the articles and books to the context of the 2011 Arab Spring events. Critical juncture hypothesis states that politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a country has, because the former represents the distribution of political power. Whoever controls political institutions then can set up economic institutions, determining the rules governing economic activities and who will benefit from them. Generated resources are then used in defending these sets of institutions. Though for Acemoglu and his co-authors politics always precedes economics, it is the interplay of political and economic institutions that explain contemporary development of states. The case of 2011 Egyptian Revolution is presented, as the well-documented illustraion of the hypothesis at work.","PeriodicalId":101499,"journal":{"name":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Employing the Critical juncture hypothesis to explain the 2011 Egyptian revolution\",\"authors\":\"Rustam Mussa, Raushan Yesbergen\",\"doi\":\"10.52123/1994-2370-2021-517\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Our research question involves applying the critical juncture hypothesis formulated by Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors in the series of the articles and books to the context of the 2011 Arab Spring events. Critical juncture hypothesis states that politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a country has, because the former represents the distribution of political power. Whoever controls political institutions then can set up economic institutions, determining the rules governing economic activities and who will benefit from them. Generated resources are then used in defending these sets of institutions. Though for Acemoglu and his co-authors politics always precedes economics, it is the interplay of political and economic institutions that explain contemporary development of states. The case of 2011 Egyptian Revolution is presented, as the well-documented illustraion of the hypothesis at work.\",\"PeriodicalId\":101499,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.52123/1994-2370-2021-517\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.52123/1994-2370-2021-517","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Employing the Critical juncture hypothesis to explain the 2011 Egyptian revolution
Our research question involves applying the critical juncture hypothesis formulated by Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors in the series of the articles and books to the context of the 2011 Arab Spring events. Critical juncture hypothesis states that politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a country has, because the former represents the distribution of political power. Whoever controls political institutions then can set up economic institutions, determining the rules governing economic activities and who will benefit from them. Generated resources are then used in defending these sets of institutions. Though for Acemoglu and his co-authors politics always precedes economics, it is the interplay of political and economic institutions that explain contemporary development of states. The case of 2011 Egyptian Revolution is presented, as the well-documented illustraion of the hypothesis at work.