对抗反向JPEG兼容性攻击:选择你的立场

Jan Butora, P. Bas
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引用次数: 4

摘要

在这项工作中,我们的目标是设计一种无法被反向JPEG兼容性攻击(RJCA)检测到的隐写方案。虽然RJCA仅对质量因子为99和100的JPEG图像有效,但其工作主要是由于DCT系数解压缩后舍入误差方差的变化,这是由嵌入与JPEG格式不兼容的更改引起的。保留上述格式的一种补救措施是在嵌入期间利用JPEG压缩期间产生的舍入误差,但是如果不知道这一点,没有任何隐写方法可以适应RJCA。检查嵌入变化对方差和解压缩舍入误差均值的影响,我们提出了一种无需任何侧信息即可抵抗RJCA的隐写方法。为了抵抗RJCA,我们提出了一种失真度量,使DCT块内的所有嵌入变化都依赖于此,从而产生基于晶格的嵌入。然后,事实证明,通过检查它们对解压缩舍入误差方差的影响,巧妙地选择(二进制)嵌入变化的一侧,并简单地使用统一的代价来强制它们在DCT块上的稀疏性,就足够了。为了提高空间(像素)域对检测器的安全性,我们展示了一种将所提出的方法与为空间域安全性设计的隐写术相结合的简单方法,进一步提高了质量因子99的不可检测性。与现有的非知情隐写术相比,检测器的准确率提高了40%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fighting the Reverse JPEG Compatibility Attack: Pick your Side
In this work we aim to design a steganographic scheme undetectable by the Reverse JPEG Compatibility Attack (RJCA). The RJCA, while only effective for JPEG images compressed with quality factors 99 and 100, was shown to work mainly due to change in variance of the rounding errors after decompression of the DCT coefficients, which is induced by embedding changes incompatible with the JPEG format. One remedy to preserve the aforementioned format is utilizing during the embedding the rounding errors created during the JPEG compression, but no steganographic method is known to be resilient to RJCA without this knowledge. Inspecting the effect of embedding changes on variance and also mean of decompression rounding errors, we propose a steganographic method allowing resistance against RJCA without any side-information. To resist RJCA, we propose a distortion metric making all embedding changes within a DCT block dependent, resulting in a lattice-based embedding. Then it turns out it is enough to cleverly pick the side of the (binary) embedding changes through inspection of their effect on the variance of decompression rounding errors and simply use uniform costs in order to enforce their sparsity across DCT blocks. To increase security against detectors in the spatial (pixel) domain, we show an easy way of combining the proposed methodology with steganography designed for spatial domain security, further improving the undetectability for quality factor 99. The improvements over existing non-informed steganography are up to 40% in terms of detector's accuracy.
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