Evolutionary Formation of a Justified Predatory State Under the Movement of People

As for the formation of a state, since North and Olson, many predation theories have been presented, but have not considered endogenous formations of a stable state and the effect of the movement of people. We examined these issues by replicator dynamics based on Olson’s theory of the stationary bandit. Assuming five roles, a peasant, bandit, citizen, guardian, and emigrant, where the guardian stops the harsh predation of the citizen and the citizen pays tribute to the guardian, we investigate the formation of a state. Without an emigrant, we found the formation of a stable alliance of guardians and citizens, which is interpreted as a state following previous works, because the alliance realizes Pareto-efficiency. With an emigrant, interestingly, the alliance is more likely to appear than that without it, especially when guardians adopt the comparatively low taxation. The result supports Jones’ historical perspective that lots of democratic states have emerged in Europe via governance competitions among states. Lastly, we give the interpretation of how the guardian’s violence is justified endogenously.