上任第一年:新任ceo如何创造价值?

Yihui Pan, T. Wang
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引用次数: 12

摘要

职业考虑和可能的“承诺升级”偏见意味着,更换关键决策者通常是对先前糟糕的投资决策进行有效重新优化所必需的。因此,在CEO离职后立即检查公司的行动,可以对公司的错误纠正过程提供重要的启示。我们发现,当建立业绩不佳的业务部门的首席执行官下台时,该部门被终止的可能性几乎增加了一倍。更普遍的是,在首席执行官离职后,往往会采取诸如缩减运营规模之类的纠正措施,而扩张和其他公司政策变化则不会。管理层变动极大地促进了纠正过程,尤其是在CEO离职之后。无论离职前的企业和行业状况是好是坏,甚至是由于部门CEO死亡和退休而导致的离职,更高强度的纠正措施及其积极的价值影响都是普遍存在的。离职后纠正措施的强度和价值影响也可以解释新上任的内部人ceo和外部人ceo之间的绩效差异。我们的研究表明,与CEO离职相关的价值创造的主要来源是促进错误纠正和重新优化。我们还确定了制度上的摩擦,这些摩擦可能会阻碍CEO离职时的错误纠正。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
First Year in Office: How Do New CEOS Create Value?
Career concerns and possible “escalation of commitment” bias imply that replacing key decision makers is often necessary for effective re-optimization on poor prior investment decisions. Thus, examining firm actions immediately post CEO turnover can shed important light on the error correction process in a corporation. We find that the probability that a poorly performing business segment will be terminated almost doubles when the CEO who established it steps down. More generally, corrective actions such as operational downsizing tend to follow CEO turnover, while expansion and other corporate policy changes do not. Management shakeup greatly facilitates the correction process, especially after CEO turnover. The higher intensity of corrective actions and their positive value impact post CEO turnover hold pervasively, whether the pre-turnover firm and industry conditions are good or bad, and even for turnovers due to the death and retirement of the department CEOs. The intensity and value impact of post-turnover corrective actions can also explain the well documented performance difference between new insider and outsider CEOs. Our study suggests that a main source of value creation associated with CEO turnover is the facilitation of error correction and re-optimization. We also identify institutional frictions that can hinder error correction at CEO turnover.
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