{"title":"冲突后宪法中的永恒","authors":"S. Şuteu","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses eternity clauses as drafting mechanisms that facilitate and safeguard post-conflict constitution-making. It discloses the constitutional bargaining dynamics specific to conflict-affected settings and reveals the largely ignored function of unamendability. It also highlights three distinctive roles played by post-conflict unamendability: signalling compliance with international norms, ensuring electoral turnover, and insulating political and military elites. This chapter shows how contested and sometimes incoherent the unamendable values in post-conflict constitutions can be, reflecting the messiness of constitution-making processes in certain contexts. It outlines the risks associated with expecting too much from eternity clauses in fraught state-building settings that are habitually characterized by institutional weakness and shifting political commitments.","PeriodicalId":241615,"journal":{"name":"Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Eternity in Post-Conflict Constitutions\",\"authors\":\"S. Şuteu\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter analyses eternity clauses as drafting mechanisms that facilitate and safeguard post-conflict constitution-making. It discloses the constitutional bargaining dynamics specific to conflict-affected settings and reveals the largely ignored function of unamendability. It also highlights three distinctive roles played by post-conflict unamendability: signalling compliance with international norms, ensuring electoral turnover, and insulating political and military elites. This chapter shows how contested and sometimes incoherent the unamendable values in post-conflict constitutions can be, reflecting the messiness of constitution-making processes in certain contexts. It outlines the risks associated with expecting too much from eternity clauses in fraught state-building settings that are habitually characterized by institutional weakness and shifting political commitments.\",\"PeriodicalId\":241615,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858867.003.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter analyses eternity clauses as drafting mechanisms that facilitate and safeguard post-conflict constitution-making. It discloses the constitutional bargaining dynamics specific to conflict-affected settings and reveals the largely ignored function of unamendability. It also highlights three distinctive roles played by post-conflict unamendability: signalling compliance with international norms, ensuring electoral turnover, and insulating political and military elites. This chapter shows how contested and sometimes incoherent the unamendable values in post-conflict constitutions can be, reflecting the messiness of constitution-making processes in certain contexts. It outlines the risks associated with expecting too much from eternity clauses in fraught state-building settings that are habitually characterized by institutional weakness and shifting political commitments.