{"title":"经验在多大程度上像信念?","authors":"Sam Hawke","doi":"10.33043/s.1.1.44-49","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"To What Extent is Experience Like Belief?\",\"authors\":\"Sam Hawke\",\"doi\":\"10.33043/s.1.1.44-49\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.\",\"PeriodicalId\":375047,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.1.1.44-49\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.1.1.44-49","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.
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