基于中国批量采购政策的公立医院心脏病医师薪酬制度适应性研究

Rong-lin Yan
{"title":"基于中国批量采购政策的公立医院心脏病医师薪酬制度适应性研究","authors":"Rong-lin Yan","doi":"10.1145/3481127.3481129","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On January 1st, 2021, the Chinese healthcare system enforced the Volume-based Purchasing (VBP) policy in the heart stents market, which dramatically cut the price of stents by 90%. It will be more affordable for people who suffer from cardiovascular disease. However, before VBP policy, cardiologists’ income mainly comes from two pathways, salary from the hospital and the kickbacks from distributors. The salary for cardiologists dominated relied on the surgery service fee, which is priced by the level of the hospital. The higher level the hospital is, the higher price of the surgery will be. In that case, cardiologists who work in a secondary hospital will still be exposed to the same amount of radiation as those who work in a tertiary hospital but will be paid less. In terms of effectiveness, the VBP policy does reduce some medical bribery but also causes significant loss of income to cardiologists at the same time. Nevertheless, there is no feasible policy to make up for the loss of compensation. Cardiologists, especially in secondary hospitals, are impending to quit from the public healthcare system to private healthcare organizations. This study uses the data both from a secondary hospital and the supplier in a pilot province as a case, focusing on the medical salary system. It uses descriptive analysis and linear regression methods to determine the possible relationship among relative variables in the hospital and the distributor. It will provide a tuning suggestion using a cost method in accounting analysis inside the healthcare cost system to avoid future manpower loss and other unexpected medical behaviors. It indicates that cardiologists are half less paid in the view of income level, compared with their contributions to the hospital, and they are paid lower than what the society estimates regarding the income level to physicians. In terms of salary structure, the current paying package, which contains 30% fixed and 70% performed pay, is the main reason that drives cardiologists to become overtreating and profit-seeking. Kickbacks are the under-table income paid by distributors, which is around 9.7% of the heart stents portfolio but will soon be blocked by the VBP policy. Kickbacks paid by the distributor are almost as much as the salary paid by the hospital. Therefore, if the hospital could shed light on cardiologists’ salary and adjust its structure, it would be more efficient and sustainable to allocate and use the human resource based on the experienced cost accounting in the healthcare system. The author hopes the discussion in this article would provide the inspiration and empirical reference for the salary reform of secondary public hospitals in China.","PeriodicalId":115326,"journal":{"name":"The 2021 12th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics","volume":"294 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Study on the Adaptability of Cardiologists Salary System in Chinese Public Hospitals Based on the Chinese Volume-based Purchasing Policy\",\"authors\":\"Rong-lin Yan\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3481127.3481129\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"On January 1st, 2021, the Chinese healthcare system enforced the Volume-based Purchasing (VBP) policy in the heart stents market, which dramatically cut the price of stents by 90%. It will be more affordable for people who suffer from cardiovascular disease. However, before VBP policy, cardiologists’ income mainly comes from two pathways, salary from the hospital and the kickbacks from distributors. The salary for cardiologists dominated relied on the surgery service fee, which is priced by the level of the hospital. The higher level the hospital is, the higher price of the surgery will be. In that case, cardiologists who work in a secondary hospital will still be exposed to the same amount of radiation as those who work in a tertiary hospital but will be paid less. In terms of effectiveness, the VBP policy does reduce some medical bribery but also causes significant loss of income to cardiologists at the same time. Nevertheless, there is no feasible policy to make up for the loss of compensation. Cardiologists, especially in secondary hospitals, are impending to quit from the public healthcare system to private healthcare organizations. This study uses the data both from a secondary hospital and the supplier in a pilot province as a case, focusing on the medical salary system. It uses descriptive analysis and linear regression methods to determine the possible relationship among relative variables in the hospital and the distributor. It will provide a tuning suggestion using a cost method in accounting analysis inside the healthcare cost system to avoid future manpower loss and other unexpected medical behaviors. It indicates that cardiologists are half less paid in the view of income level, compared with their contributions to the hospital, and they are paid lower than what the society estimates regarding the income level to physicians. In terms of salary structure, the current paying package, which contains 30% fixed and 70% performed pay, is the main reason that drives cardiologists to become overtreating and profit-seeking. Kickbacks are the under-table income paid by distributors, which is around 9.7% of the heart stents portfolio but will soon be blocked by the VBP policy. Kickbacks paid by the distributor are almost as much as the salary paid by the hospital. Therefore, if the hospital could shed light on cardiologists’ salary and adjust its structure, it would be more efficient and sustainable to allocate and use the human resource based on the experienced cost accounting in the healthcare system. The author hopes the discussion in this article would provide the inspiration and empirical reference for the salary reform of secondary public hospitals in China.\",\"PeriodicalId\":115326,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The 2021 12th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics\",\"volume\":\"294 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The 2021 12th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3481127.3481129\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The 2021 12th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3481127.3481129","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

从2021年1月1日起,中国医疗系统在心脏支架市场实施了批量采购(VBP)政策,支架价格大幅降低了90%。患有心血管疾病的人更能负担得起。而在VBP政策出台之前,心脏科医生的收入主要来自两个渠道,医院的工资和经销商的回扣。心脏病专家的工资主要依赖于手术服务费,这是根据医院的级别定价的。医院级别越高,手术费用越高。在这种情况下,在二级医院工作的心脏病专家仍然会受到与在三级医院工作的心脏病专家同样多的辐射,但薪水会少一些。就有效性而言,VBP政策确实减少了一些医疗贿赂,但同时也给心脏病专家造成了重大的收入损失。然而,没有可行的政策来弥补赔偿损失。心脏病专家,尤其是二级医院的心脏病专家,即将从公共医疗系统跳槽到私人医疗机构。本研究以试点省份某二级医院和供应商的数据为例,重点研究医疗工资制度。采用描述性分析和线性回归的方法确定医院和经销商的相关变量之间可能存在的关系。本文将在医疗成本系统内部的会计分析中使用成本法提供调整建议,以避免未来的人力损失和其他意外的医疗行为。它表明,从收入水平来看,心脏病专家的收入比他们对医院的贡献少了一半,而且他们的收入低于社会对医生收入水平的估计。从薪酬结构上看,目前固定工资占30%,绩效工资占70%的薪酬结构是导致心脏病医生过度治疗和逐利的主要原因。回扣是经销商支付的隐性收入,约占心脏支架投资组合的9.7%,但很快就会被VBP政策所阻止。经销商给的回扣几乎和医院给的工资一样多。因此,如果医院能够明确心脏病专家的薪酬并调整其结构,那么基于医疗系统中经验丰富的成本核算来分配和使用人力资源将更加高效和可持续。希望本文的探讨能为中国二级公立医院薪酬改革提供启示和经验借鉴。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Study on the Adaptability of Cardiologists Salary System in Chinese Public Hospitals Based on the Chinese Volume-based Purchasing Policy
On January 1st, 2021, the Chinese healthcare system enforced the Volume-based Purchasing (VBP) policy in the heart stents market, which dramatically cut the price of stents by 90%. It will be more affordable for people who suffer from cardiovascular disease. However, before VBP policy, cardiologists’ income mainly comes from two pathways, salary from the hospital and the kickbacks from distributors. The salary for cardiologists dominated relied on the surgery service fee, which is priced by the level of the hospital. The higher level the hospital is, the higher price of the surgery will be. In that case, cardiologists who work in a secondary hospital will still be exposed to the same amount of radiation as those who work in a tertiary hospital but will be paid less. In terms of effectiveness, the VBP policy does reduce some medical bribery but also causes significant loss of income to cardiologists at the same time. Nevertheless, there is no feasible policy to make up for the loss of compensation. Cardiologists, especially in secondary hospitals, are impending to quit from the public healthcare system to private healthcare organizations. This study uses the data both from a secondary hospital and the supplier in a pilot province as a case, focusing on the medical salary system. It uses descriptive analysis and linear regression methods to determine the possible relationship among relative variables in the hospital and the distributor. It will provide a tuning suggestion using a cost method in accounting analysis inside the healthcare cost system to avoid future manpower loss and other unexpected medical behaviors. It indicates that cardiologists are half less paid in the view of income level, compared with their contributions to the hospital, and they are paid lower than what the society estimates regarding the income level to physicians. In terms of salary structure, the current paying package, which contains 30% fixed and 70% performed pay, is the main reason that drives cardiologists to become overtreating and profit-seeking. Kickbacks are the under-table income paid by distributors, which is around 9.7% of the heart stents portfolio but will soon be blocked by the VBP policy. Kickbacks paid by the distributor are almost as much as the salary paid by the hospital. Therefore, if the hospital could shed light on cardiologists’ salary and adjust its structure, it would be more efficient and sustainable to allocate and use the human resource based on the experienced cost accounting in the healthcare system. The author hopes the discussion in this article would provide the inspiration and empirical reference for the salary reform of secondary public hospitals in China.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信