{"title":"最优研发外包","authors":"P. Leoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2686782","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study optimal contracts when R\\&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to the lowest acceptable chance of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compensations. This assumption is significantly different from those used in the literature, and it is necessary for the result to hold.","PeriodicalId":419336,"journal":{"name":"Management of Innovation eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal R&D Outsourcing\",\"authors\":\"P. Leoni\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2686782\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study optimal contracts when R\\\\&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to the lowest acceptable chance of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compensations. This assumption is significantly different from those used in the literature, and it is necessary for the result to hold.\",\"PeriodicalId\":419336,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Management of Innovation eJournal\",\"volume\":\"65 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-11-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Management of Innovation eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2686782\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Management of Innovation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2686782","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study optimal contracts when R\&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to the lowest acceptable chance of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compensations. This assumption is significantly different from those used in the literature, and it is necessary for the result to hold.
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