劳动关系后的诚实

Mariana Blanco, Juan-Camilo Cardenas
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引用次数: 3

摘要

在一项对照实验结束时,研究助理被雇来对在线报纸上的新闻进行编码,实验者兼雇主要求他们中的一些人掷骰子并报告结果,以获得与报告数字1到6成线性关系的现金报酬,可以从1.6美元到9.4美元不等。另一组类似的学生,以类似的方式招募,也被邀请执行相同的掷骰子任务,但他们与实验雇主没有事先的劳动关系。我们的处理组平均表现出更高的诚实水平,因为他们报告的数字分布较少向右倾斜,也就是说,长期劳动关系组比我们的对照组更有可能报告更接近均匀(诚实)分布的数字,在这种实验中,比其他报告的数字。我们推测,先前实验组的实验对象关系诱导了参与者之间更高水平的诚实。其中一个可能的原因是,为“治疗”组学生创造的劳动关系包括一系列涉及非自愿失业可能性的冲击,这激励了学生们表现出诚实,这是一种在劳动力市场上可能受到重视的品质。这篇论文有助于理解诚实和欺骗动机的文献越来越多。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Honesty after a Labor Relationship
At the end of a controlled experiment where research assistants were hired for coding news from online newspapers, the experimenter-employer asked a number of them to roll a die and report the result in order to be paid in cash an amount linear on the reported number from 1 to 6 that could go from 1.6 to 9.4 USD. Another (control) group of similar students, recruited in a similar manner, were also invited to perform the same die-roll task, but they had no prior labor relationship with the experimenter-employer. Our treatment group showed in average higher levels of honesty as their distribution of reported numbers was less skewed to the right, that is, the long-term labor relationship group was more likely to report numbers that are closer to the uniform (honest) distribution than our control, and than other reported numbers in this kind of experiments. We conjecture that the previous experimenter-subject relationship of the treatment group induced higher levels of honesty among the participants. One of the possible reasons is that the labor relationship created for the group of ”treatment” students included a series of shocks that involved the possibility of involuntary unemployment, bringing incentives for the students to signal honesty as a trait that could be valued in the labor market. This paper contributes to the growing literature on understanding the motives for honesty and cheating.
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