家电更新中政府与企业行为分析

Q. Gu, Tiegang Gao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

家电更换可以在两种情况下实施:有和没有政府的财政补贴。企业作为家电更换的实施主体,有更换和不更换两种选择。本文运用系统动力学方法分析了基于混合策略博弈的政府和企业的行为。根据对长期行为的模拟,无论是否有财政补贴,只要能从置换中获得利润,所有企业都会选择进行置换;如果不能从置换中获得利润,即使有财政补贴,企业也会选择放弃置换。这意味着如果企业能够从替代中获得利润,政府可以选择停止提供财政补贴。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavior Analysis for Government and Enterprise in Home-Appliance Replacement
Home-appliance replacement may be implemented in two situations: with and without the financial subsidy offered by the government. As the implement entity of the home-appliance replacement, the enterprise may have two choices: with and without the replacement. In this paper, we analyzed the behaviors of the government and the enterprise based on a mixed-strategy game by system dynamics methodology. According to the simulation of the long term behavior, all of the enterprises will chose to carry out the replacement no matter with or without financial subsidy if they can obtain profit from the replacement; all of the enterprises will chose to give up the replacement even though with financial subsidy if they can't obtain profit from the replacement. It means that the government can choose to stop offering financial subsidy if the enterprise can obtain profit from the replacement.
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